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1105 
DISCLOSURE, ENDORSEMENT, AND 
IDENTITY IN SOCIAL MARKETING 
William McGeveran* 
Social marketing is among the newest advertising trends now 
emerging on the internet.  Using online social networks such as Face-
book or MySpace, marketers could send personalized promotional 
messages featuring an ordinary customer to that customer’s friends.  
Because they reveal a customer’s browsing and buying patterns, and 
because they feature implied endorsements, the messages raise signifi-
cant concerns about disclosure of personal matters, information qual-
ity, and individuals’ ability to control the commercial exploitation of 
their identity.  Yet social marketing falls through the cracks between 
several different legal paradigms that might allow its regulation—
spanning from privacy to trademark and unfair competition to con-
sumer protection to the appropriation tort and rights of publicity.  
This Article examines potential concerns with social marketing and 
the various legal responses available.  It demonstrates that none of the 
existing legal paradigms, which all evolved in response to particular 
problems, addresses the unique new challenges posed by social mar-
keting.  Even though policymakers ultimately may choose not to re-
gulate social marketing at all, that decision cannot be made intelli-
gently without first contemplating possible problems and solutions.  
The Article concludes by suggesting a legal response that draws from 
existing law and requires only small changes.  In doing so, it provides 
an example for adapting existing law to new technology, and it argues 
that law should play a more active role in establishing best practices 
for emerging online trends. 
 
 *  Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School.  I am grateful for helpful com-
ments and assistance from Ann Bartow, Dan Burk, Mike Carroll, Jesse Cheng, Danielle Citron, Tom 
Cotter, Deven Desai, Christine Haight Farley, James Grimmelmann, Eric Goldman, Steven Hetcher, 
Laura Heymann, Brian Holland, Mark Janis, Ruth Okediji, Frank Pasquale, Jessica Silbey, Lars 
Smith, and Diane Zimmerman.  Versions of this Article were presented at the Reputation Economies 
in Cyberspace Symposium at Yale Law School; the Computers, Freedom, and Privacy 2008 Confe-
rence in New Haven; the Intellectual Property Roundtable on User-Generated Content, Social Net-
working, and Virtual Worlds at Vanderbilt University Law School; the Works in Progress in Intellec-
tual Property Colloquium at Tulane University Law School; and the Intellectual Property Scholars 
Workshop at Drake University Law School.  I received valuable research assistance from David Couil-
lard and Jennifer Cross. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you wander into a bookstore.  Out of curiosity, you 
thumb through the newest novel of an author you loathe, and then you 
purchase two other books, one as a gift and one for yourself.  Now im-
agine that the moment you turn away from the sales counter, all your 
friends receive an e-mail message urging them to consider buying all 
three books because you, their friend, had looked at them.  You may 
raise several objections all at once.  First, many shoppers would find au-
tomatic disclosure to their friends of personal browsing and buying to be 
intrusive.  Furthermore, the resulting message probably misleads its re-
cipients because you do not actually want to read at least one, and per-
haps two, of the listed books.  Finally, you may consider this commercial 
exploitation of your personal identity objectionable.  If the nascent prac-
tice of “social marketing”1 catches on, however, something very similar 
 
 1. The term “social marketing” has been applied to marketing for charitable or socially benefi-
cial causes, such as anti-smoking or other health promotion campaigns.  See, e.g., Philip Kotler & Ge-
rald Zaltman, Social Marketing: An Approach to Planned Social Change, 35 J. MARKETING, July 1971, 
at 3.  For that reason, some have objected to the use of this nomenclature for marketing conducted 
through online social networks, as discussed in this Article.  See, e.g., Spare Change, Social Marketing 
vs. “Social Marketing” Smackdown, http://social-marketing.com/blog/2006/09/social-marketing-vs-
social-marketing.html (Sept. 6, 2006).  Notwithstanding any regrettable confusion that might result, 
“social marketing” has become the common and convenient name to refer to the techniques discussed 
in this Article, and I use it here. 
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may soon happen routinely on the internet, raising all of these possible 
concerns. 
The popular online social networking platform Facebook launched 
such an initiative, Facebook Ads, in November 2007.2  Web sites outside 
of Facebook could determine whether their visitors had Facebook ac-
counts and, if so, disseminate information about those customers’ inter-
net browsing, purchases, or other activities throughout their Facebook 
social networks.  Thus, someone who rented a particular movie at Block-
buster Video’s web site could find that fact announced to all her friends 
through their Facebook “News Feeds.”3  Initially, the only notice she re-
ceived was the brief appearance of a pop-up window that allowed her to 
cancel the message; if she took no action, the site quickly removed the 
window and sent the message.4  Although Facebook’s initial foray into 
social marketing was not successful,5 several trends strongly indicate that 
the practice will return in some form, and Facebook is now experiment-
ing with several different approaches.6  Social network providers face a 
compelling need to raise revenue, while advertisers crave efficient target-
ing of referrals from their existing customers.  The potential rewards for 
both parties seem certain to encourage development of new social mar-
keting initiatives. 
Interactive tools on the internet—including social networks and 
other utilities for sharing opinions about products and services—hold 
great promise for improved communication and enhanced consumer 
choice.  Social marketing can play a positive role in that system.  If poor-
ly designed, however, such a program would fail to achieve these benefits 
or even, in some circumstances, destroy them. 
Like celebrity endorsements or cross-branding agreements, social 
marketing is a form of reputational piggybacking.  All three allow a mar-
keter to benefit from an association with someone else’s well-known 
identity.  Unlike other arrangements, however, social marketing capi-
 
 2. As The New York Times explained it, “Yesterday, in a twist on word-of-mouth marketing, 
Facebook began selling ads that display people’s profile photos next to commercial messages that are 
shown to their friends about items they purchased or registered an opinion about.”  Louise Story,  
Facebook Is Marketing Your Brand Preferences (with Your Permission), N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2007, at 
C5.  For more information about the functioning of social networking, see infra Part I.B.  For more 
details about Facebook Ads in particular, see infra Part I.C. 
 3. “News Feed is a constantly updating list of stories about actions your friends have taken on 
Facebook.”  Facebook, Getting Started Guide, http://www.facebook.com/help/new_user_guide.php? 
guide_section=explore_facebook (last visited May 26, 2009). 
 4. See Amy Morganstern, Comment, In the Spotlight: Social Network Advertising and the Right 
of Publicity, 12 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 181, 183–84 (2008); Posting of Benjamin Googins to CA Secu-
rity Advisor Research Blog, http://community.ca.com/blogs/securityadvisor/archive/2007/11/29/ 
facebook-socialads-going-too-far.aspx (Nov. 29, 2007, 14:59). 
 5. Ellen S. Bass, Comment, A Right in Search of a Coherent Rationale—Conceptualizing Perso-
na in a Comparative Context: The United States Right of Publicity and German Personality Rights, 42 
U.S.F. L. REV. 799, 800 n.5 (2008). 
 6. See Brad Stone, Facebook Aims to Extend Its Reach Across the Web, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 
2008, at B3; Helen Leggatt, Facebook Tests 3 New Social Ad Formats, BIZREPORT, Aug. 22, 2008, 
http://www.bizreport.com/2008/08/facebook_tests_3_new_social_ad_formats.html. 
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talizes on individuals’ reputations among their friends, not just in the 
public at large.  In some forms, it does so without authentic consent.  
And unlike those other examples of reputational piggybacking, the law 
has yet to develop rules for social marketing. 
Potential problems fall into several distinct types: disclosure, en-
dorsement, and identity.  First and most clearly, the individual disclo-
sures made in social marketing messages could impinge on personal pri-
vacy.  Second, some designs for social marketing could cause information 
quality problems that degrade not only the effectiveness or accuracy of a 
particular endorsement, but also the entire ecology of online peer rec-
ommendation.  Finally, social marketing threatens to rob the individual 
of control over the commercial exploitation of identity and reputation. 
At present, social marketing falls through the cracks between sever-
al different sources of possible legal regulation—spanning from privacy 
to trademark and unfair competition to the appropriation tort and rights 
of publicity to consumer protection regulation.  New combinations of 
technology and business techniques transcend the old categories.  A large 
class action lawsuit filed against Facebook Ads proves this point, because 
the complaint struggles, with limited success, to fit its claims into the pig-
eonholes of current law.7  Constraints within each legal paradigm, though 
appropriate to the distinct situations from which its rules arise, prevent 
that law from influencing social marketing design.  Modes of enforce-
ment and measurement of damages render some related law largely 
toothless.  And in any case, the existing paradigms were tailored to ad-
dress only a subset of the concerns—disclosure or endorsement or identi-
ty—and not all three at once. 
This Article considers what tools existing law might offer regulators 
and how these tools fall short, and begins thinking about a future legal 
approach to social marketing.  To be absolutely clear, it examines poten-
tial legal responses to problems that may not require legal intervention in 
the end, depending on how social marketing develops.  Though it might 
be premature to reach final decisions about legal treatment of social 
marketing, it is time to start evaluating the options.  Ultimately, one 
might reach a normative conclusion that the law should leave social mar-
keting to be regulated by other means—presumably market forces, on-
line social norms, and the technological design of social networking plat-
forms.8  It is just too early to say for certain.  This evaluation, however, 
requires at least a preliminary inquiry into the nature of possible legal 
regulation.  In the course of that inquiry, we will discover some reasons 
to be cautious about the optimistic view that problems arising from social 
marketing will self-correct through other means.  At a minimum, this Ar-
 
 7. See Complaint at 1, Lane v. Facebook, Inc., No. C08 03845 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2008), availa-
ble at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/california/candce/5:2008cv03845/206085/1/ [he-
reinafter Lane Complaint}. 
 8. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 86–90, 235–39 (1999). 
MCGEVERAN.DOC 7/24/2009  12:01 PM 
No. 4] SOCIAL MARKETING 1109 
ticle argues, the law can play a role, even if only a modest one, in crafting 
and promoting best practices for social marketing.  Those rules should 
center on ensuring the authentic consent of the people featured in social 
marketing messages. 
The analysis unfolds in four Parts.  Part I provides necessary back-
ground about word of mouth marketing, social networks, social market-
ing, and the particular example of Facebook Ads.  Part II delves into po-
tential disclosure, endorsement, and identity concerns arising from social 
marketing.  Part III turns to existing legal paradigms in the United States 
that could apply to the problems discussed in Part II.  Information priva-
cy law focuses on the revelation of particularly sensitive information.  
Trademark and unfair competition law concentrates on the accuracy of 
marketing messages.  “Persona rights” law, through the appropriation 
tort and right of publicity, recognizes an individual interest in controlling 
the exploitation of one’s own identity.  Finally, consumer protection law 
ensures fair and competitive marketing.  All these paradigmatic legal 
responses have something to say about social marketing, but none aligns 
fully with the emerging practice. 
Part IV reduces the paradigms discussed in Part III to an essential 
shared component that is relevant to social marketing: consent.  The dif-
ferent approaches unite in their implication that, at a minimum, advertis-
ers should secure robust affirmative consent for all endorsements fea-
tured in their advertising messages.  Part IV suggests some possible 
standards for judging consent and means of enforcing them.  In doing so, 
it provides an example for adapting existing law to new technology, and 
it argues that law should play a proactive role in establishing best prac-
tices for emerging online trends. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Online Word of Mouth 
“Word of mouth” describes peer-to-peer interactions in which an 
individual passes on opinions about a product to others.9  The opinion 
could be positive or negative, specific or general.  Traditionally, as the 
name suggests, the interactions were simple conversations.  Professional 
marketers view word of mouth as “the most important source of influ-
ence in the purchase of household goods, and advice from other consum-
ers about a service exerts a greater influence than all marketer-generated 
information combined.”10 
 
 9. See generally Eric Goldman, Online Word of Mouth and Its Implications for Trademark Law, 
in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 404, 404 (Graeme 
B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2008); Nicholas Negroponte & Pattie Maes, Electronic Word of 
Mouth, WIRED, Oct. 1996, at 218. 
 10. Kineta H. Hung & Stella Yiyan Li, The Influence of eWOM on Virtual Consumer Communi-
ties: Social Capital, Consumer Learning, and Behavioral Outcomes, 47 J. ADVERTISING RES., 485, 485 
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Marketers want to encourage positive word-of-mouth messages 
about their products for reasons of both quantity and quality.  Partly, this 
importance reflects the vast number of interactions involved: one adver-
tising researcher estimates that Americans participate in 3.5 billion word-
of-mouth conversations daily and that 49 percent of those who hear word 
of mouth are “highly likely” to pass that information on to others.11  
Word of mouth also cuts through the clutter of advertising and catches a 
distractible consumer’s attention.12  Most fundamentally, however, word 
of mouth influences consumers’ decisions because they believe it: a rec-
ommendation from a disinterested person similar to the consumer is like-
ly to be “immediate, personal, credible, and relevant.”13  As Facebook 
founder Mark Zuckerberg noted when rolling out Facebook Ads, an en-
dorsement from an especially familiar source such as a family member, 
friend, or acquaintance with high credibility—the so-called trusted refer-
ral14—is pretty much the “Holy Grail” of marketing.15 
Long before the internet, creative companies developed strategies 
to encourage positive word-of-mouth messages.  The Tupperware party 
is a classic pre-internet example of selling products through peer connec-
tions.16  Book publishers and record labels distribute copies of their offer-
 
(2007); see also Ed Keller, Unleashing the Power of Word of Mouth: Creating Brand Advocacy to Drive 
Growth, 47 J. ADVERTISING RES., 448, 448 (2007) (“The evidence is becoming clear: word of mouth 
has now become the most important and effective communications channel.”); Word of Mouth Mar-
keting Association, An Introduction to Word of Mouth Marketing, at http://www.womma.org/ 
womm101/ (last visited May 26, 2009) (“Word of mouth marketing empowers people to share their 
experiences. It's harnessing the voice of the customer for the good of the brand.”). 
 11. See Keller, supra note 10, at 450–51. 
 12. Justin Kirby, How to Manage and Measure the Word of Mouth Revolution, 
MARKETINGPROFS, Feb. 28, 2006, http://www.marketingprofs.com/6/kirby1.asp (“Acute advertising 
clutter is making it increasingly difficult for traditional marketing campaigns to break through and cap-
ture people's attention.  To avoid the advertising cacophony, buyers turn to their friends for word of 
mouth recommendations.”). 
 13. Maria Flores Letelier et al., Strategies for Viral Marketing, in KELLOGG ON INTEGRATED 
MARKETING 90, 90 (Dawn Iacobucci & Bobby Calder eds., 2003); see also LOIS KELLY, BEYOND 
BUZZ: THE NEXT GENERATION OF WORD-OF-MOUTH MARKETING 14 (2007) (“Surveys say that 
people don’t trust companies and that the only way to win back that trust is through communicating in 
new ways.”); GEORGE SILVERMAN, THE SECRETS OF WORD-OF-MOUTH MARKETING 23–35 (2001) 
(discussing reasons for the high influence of word of mouth); Donnavieve Smith et al., Online Peer and 
Editorial Recommendations, Trust, and Choice in Virtual Markets, J. INTERACTIVE MARKETING, 
Summer 2005, at 15, 32 (reporting empirical study demonstrating that online consumers rely on inde-
pendent recommendations more than they rely on sponsored ads). 
 14. See Caroline McCarthy, Facebook Ads Makes a Flashy Debut in New York, CNET NEWS, 
Nov. 6, 2007, http://news.cnet.com/the-social/8301-13577_3-9811932-36.html (referring to Facebook 
Ads as “rooted in viral trends and ‘trusted referrals’”). 
 15. See Posting of Dan Farber to Between the Lines, Facebook Beacon Update: No Activities 
Published Without User Proactively Consenting, http://blogs.zdnet.com/BTL/?p=7188 (Nov. 29, 2007, 
19:05) (reporting Zuckerberg’s remarks); see also Story, supra note 2 (“Nothing influences a person 
more than a recommendation from a trusted friend.” (quoting Zuckerberg)); Press Release, Facebook, 
Facebook Unveils Facebook Ads (Nov. 6, 2007), http://www.facebook.com/press/releases.php?p=9176 
(“Social actions are powerful because they act as trusted referrals and reinforce the fact that people 
influence people.” (quoting Zuckerberg)). 
 16. See Letelier et al., supra note 13, at 90.  The telephone company MCI used similar personal 
connections in its successful promotion to give higher discounts for calls among “friends and family” 
who became MCI customers.  Notably, however, AT&T responded with an extensive ad campaign 
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ings to literary and musical opinion leaders in the hope that these trusted 
sources enjoy them and discuss them with friends and colleagues, creat-
ing positive word of mouth.17  Vendors offer customers incentives, such 
as discounts, for referring friends to them.18  Publicity events or stunts 
that grab media attention indirectly stimulate conversation among con-
sumers.19  For example, children’s bookstores held elaborate midnight re-
lease parties to unveil new Harry Potter books, a trend that has now 
spread to other titles.20  Most recently, critics have focused on “buzz mar-
keting,” the practice of compensating individuals to insinuate positive 
word of mouth about a product into their everyday conversations.21 
Prior to the advent of online communication, however, practical 
impediments prevented word of mouth from becoming a reliable and 
consistent aspect of marketing strategy.22  It was too difficult to catalyze 
such endorsements or to control their message.  There was little available 
means to identify potential endorsers or the audiences over which they 
might exert influence.23  And, crucially for this analysis, all of these tactics 
required the marketer to persuade people to engage in their own perso-
nalized word-of-mouth interactions.  The individual discussing a product 
chose the time, the audience, and the message.  Really, then, these forms 
of word-of-mouth marketing resemble public relations more than adver-
tising. 
 
attacking the program as an irritating invasion of privacy.  See Jennifer L. Givens & James Kyle 
Lynch, MCI Communications Corporation: Friends and Family, in NEW PRODUCT SUCCESS STORIES 
196, 201–05 (Robert J. Thomas ed., 1995). 
 17. See, e.g., Esther Margolis, The Role of Promotion in the Book Publishing Process, 33 LIBR. 
TRENDS 215, 217–21 (1984). 
 18. See, e.g., Virgin Mobile, Referral Rewards Program—Virgin Mobile Kickbacks, http://www. 
virginmobileusa.com/promos/kickbacks.do (last visited May 26, 2009) (explaining a program to reward 
mobile phone customers who refer their friends to the company with sixty free minutes).  See generally 
SILVERMAN, supra note 13, at 188–90 (discussing “referral selling programs”). 
 19. See Geoff Williams, Top 10 Successful Marketing Stunts, ENTREPRENEUR, July 20, 2006, 
http://www.entrepreneur.com/marketing/marketingideas/article159484.html.  In a more outlandish 
example, Ford Motor Company reportedly gives Mustang cars to flight attendants to drive during 
layovers so that people see “glamorous” women driving the vehicle, internalize that image of the 
product, and talk about it.  See Letelier et al., supra note 13, at 91. 
 20. See, e.g., Carol Memmott, ‘Dawn’ Breaks Publisher’s First-Day Sales Record; ‘Twilight’ Fi-
nale Lands Amid Frenzy, USA TODAY, Aug. 4, 2008, at 1D, available at http://www.usatoday.com/life/ 
books/news/2008-08-03-breaking-dawn-sales_N.htm; see also LEONARD M. LODISH ET AL., 
ENTREPRENEURIAL MARKETING 171 (2001) (discussing lavish launch parties for release of new Mi-
crosoft Windows operating system). 
 21. See Jeanette Kennett & Steve Matthews, What’s the Buzz? Undercover Marketing and the 
Corruption of Friendship, 25 J. APPLIED PHIL. 2, 3 (2008); see also, e.g., Jackie Crosby, Bloggers Seeing 
Red over Target’s Little Secret, STAR TRIB., Dec. 1, 2007, at 1A, available at http://www.startribune. 
com/business/11987331.html (describing an initiative by Target Corp. to sign up “Target Rounders” 
who received discounts, CDs, and other prizes for making positive comments about Target on Face-
book and elsewhere while concealing their affiliation). 
 22. See ANDY SERNOVITZ, WORD OF MOUTH MARKETING: HOW SMART COMPANIES GET 
PEOPLE TALKING 5 (2006); Dee T. Allsop et al., Word of Mouth Research: Principles and Applications, 
47 J. ADVERTISING RES., 398, 410 (2007). 
 23. See Russell Abratt et al., Role of the Market Maven in Retailing: A General Marketplace In-
fluencer, 10 J. BUS. & PSYCHOL. 31, 53–54 (1995) (discussing, prior to the popularization of the inter-
net, difficulties in identifying those most likely to repeat positive word-of-mouth messages). 
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The internet revolutionized word of mouth.  In particular, the ex-
ploding popularity of interactive, user-generated, and cooperative forms 
of online communication—a phenomenon sometimes referred to as 
“Web 2.0”—empowers individuals to shape the information environ-
ment.24  The shift to this newer model involves changes in business and 
social attitudes as much as any technological improvements.  Perhaps its 
maturation as a mainstream phenomenon came when Time Magazine 
named “You”—meaning the millions of contributors to digital resources 
such as Wikipedia, YouTube, and open source software—as its 2006 
“person of the year.”25 
Eric Goldman has chronicled the wide range and powerful commer-
cial influence of “online word of mouth” enabled by these new communi-
cation tools.26  The internet “amplifies” consumers’ opinions through 
multiple tools, including blogs and blog comments, reviews at vendor 
web sites such as Amazon, dedicated rating and review sites such as An-
gie’s List, and of course (as discussed further below) social networks.27  
Furthermore, when word of mouth occurs, online marketers can more 
easily monitor and measure peer-to-peer communication about their 
products.28 
It is difficult to overstate the gigantic and widespread benefits of 
these developments.  At its broadest, as Yochai Benkler describes in the 
introduction to his remarkable book about the impact of peer produc-
tion, The Wealth of Networks, “We are in the midst of a technological, 
economic, and organizational transformation that allows us to renego-
tiate the terms of freedom, justice, and productivity in the information 
society.”29  On a more specific level, the exchange of information and 
recommendations enabled by new technology allows for the so-called 
long tail effect: through our shared opinions we help one another find 
more obscure products that might have eluded our attention before (and 
which are also more readily available now as a result of e-commerce).30  
“Folksonomies”—taxonomies created socially through individuals tag-
ging things and complex sorting algorithms grouping those tags—allow 
for a rich new understanding and organization of information.31  Finally, 
 
 24. See Tim O’Reilly, What Is Web 2.0: Design Patterns and Business Models for the Next Gener-
ation of Software, O’REILLY MEDIA, Sept. 30, 2005, http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/oreilly/tim/ 
news/2005/09/30/what-is-web-20.html (explaining the origins of the term “Web 2.0”). 
 25. Lev Grossman, Time Person of the Year: You, TIME, Dec. 25, 2006, at 38, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1569514,00.html. 
 26. See generally Goldman, supra note 9. 
 27. Id. at 411. 
 28. See SERNOVITZ, supra note 22, at 25–26, 167–77. 
 29. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS 
MARKETS AND FREEDOM 25 (2006). 
 30. CHRIS ANDERSON, THE LONG TAIL: WHY THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS IS SELLING LESS OF 
MORE 98–124 (2006). 
 31. See DAVID WEINBERGER, EVERYTHING IS MISCELLANEOUS: THE POWER OF THE NEW 
DIGITAL DISORDER 165–68 (2007). 
MCGEVERAN.DOC 7/24/2009  12:01 PM 
No. 4] SOCIAL MARKETING 1113 
markets function better when individual consumer purchasing decisions 
rely on improved information, as they do in an environment saturated 
with accessible and relevant peer opinions.  When this Article describes 
the problems that social marketing might raise, it is essential to keep 
these benefits in view.  This positive transformation must not become the 
proverbial baby tossed out with her bathwater. 
At the same time, just as before the internet, marketers naturally 
seek to influence the content and distribution of word-of-mouth messag-
es.32  The growing amount and power of online word of mouth also in-
creases the capacity of vendors to stimulate and sometimes manipulate 
that discussion.  The now-established art of “viral marketing,” for exam-
ple, promotes brands by associating them with content such as a video or 
web page that users voluntarily share with one another because it is in-
teresting or humorous in some way; the content also transmits a carefully 
planned and integrated marketing message.33  Some marketers, such as 
Reunion.com, use technology to scrape their users’ e-mail addresses and 
then send solicitations to those users’ friends that purport to come from 
the users themselves.34  Alongside the great promise of online recom-
mendation and word of mouth, more controversial tactics seek to harness 
it for narrower purposes and perhaps to taint its authenticity. 
B. Social Networks and Online Advertising 
Social networks like MySpace and Facebook describe their services 
as communities that allow users to communicate more efficiently and 
share information, photos, and interests with their networks of friends, 
family, and coworkers.35  Users create profiles that typically contain de-
tailed personal information such as birthdates, religious and political af-
filiations, education and employment history, and lists of hobbies, inter-
ests, and tastes in music, books, and movies.36  Users then link, by mutual 
 
 32. Goldman, supra note 9, at 414–29 (discussing marketers’ exercises of trademark rights to 
control online word of mouth). 
 33. See, e.g., The Subservient Chicken, http://www.subservientchicken.com/ (last visited May 26, 
2009) (novelty web site sponsored by Burger King to promote a new chicken sandwich where a person 
in a chicken costume obeys user commands).  See generally Daniel Terdiman, Marketers Feverish over 
Viral Ads, WIRED, Mar. 22, 2005, http://www.wired.com/techbiz/media/news/2005/03/66960 (describing 
examples of viral marketing).  Like the other terms in this space, the definition of viral marketing is 
unsettled, and some uses of the term overlap with social marketing or word-of-mouth marketing. 
 34. See David Lazarus, Too Much Contact at This Reunion, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2008, at C1.  
Such e-mail tactics have been challenged under anti-spam law.  See Hoang v. Reunion.com, Inc., No. 
C-08-3518 MMC, 2008 WL 4542418 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2008), at *1; Rules Implementing the CAN-
SPAM Act of 2003, 16 C.F.R. § 316 (2008) (defining requirements under federal anti-spam law). 
 35. See, e.g., Facebook, Facebook Factsheet, http://www.facebook.com/facebook#/press/info. 
php?factsheet (last visited May 26, 2009) (describing the purposes and uses of Facebook); MySpace, 
About Us, http://www.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=misc.aboutus (last visited May 26, 2009) 
(describing the purposes and uses of MySpace). 
 36. See James Grimmelmann, Facebook and the Social Dynamics of Privacy, 95 IOWA L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2009), manuscript at 9, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1262822 (Sept. 3, 2008) (“A 
fully filled-out Facebook profile contains about 40 pieces of recognizably personal information . . . .”). 
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consent, to the profiles of people they know, after which each friend can 
see the other’s profile and can keep track of new postings.  Privacy set-
tings allow users to control the information that other users can see, al-
though of course the provider of the social networking platform has 
access to all the information.37 
The sheer size of social networking platforms suggests that they 
should become an important new venue for advertising.  As of April 
2009, Facebook claimed over 200 million active users worldwide.38  My-
Space still probably has the most users in the United States, with approx-
imately 76 million.39  These and other social networking sites consistently 
rank among the most popular web sites in the world.40  Such eye-popping 
statistics have raised expectations about the potentially enormous profit-
ability of social networking sites.  Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation 
purchased MySpace for $580 million in 2005.41  Facebook is privately held 
and valuation estimates vary widely, but extrapolations from private in-
vestments in the company suggest that it is probably worth several billion 
dollars.42 
Social networks have tried to capitalize on their access to a large 
quantity of user data to help advertisers target their messages (and there-
by justify a higher rate).43  Both MySpace and Facebook allow advertisers 
to identify specific demographic groups based on attributes such as loca-
 
 37. See Facebook, Facebook Principles, Privacy Policy (Nov. 26, 2008), http://www.facebook. 
com/policy.php; MySpace, Privacy Policy (Feb. 28, 2008), http://www.myspace.com/index.cfm? 
fuseaction=misc.privacy. 
 38. Facebook, Statistics, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics (last visited May 26, 
2009).  Facebook says over 100 million users log on “at least once each day.”  Id. 
 39. See Posting of Michael Arrington to TechCrunch, Social Networking: Will Facebook Over-
take MySpace in the U.S. in 2009?, http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/01/13/social-networking-will-
facebook-overtake-myspace-in-the-us-in-1009/ (Jan. 13, 2009) (reporting that Facebook has 54.5 mil-
lion unique U.S. visitors compared to nearly 76 million for MySpace but that Facebook is growing 
faster than MySpace in the United States). 
 40. According to the most recent statistics from the ranking service Alexa, Facebook and My-
Space are the fourth and ninth most popular sites on the web, respectively.  Two other social network-
ing sites popular outside the United States, Hi5 and V Kontakte, also rank in the top thirty.  Finally, 
other sites with social networking features are also high on the list, including YouTube, Blogger, eBay, 
and the Chinese instant messaging site Qq.  See Alexa, Top Sites, http://www.alexa.com/topsites (last 
visited Apr. 17, 2009). 
 41. News Corp in $580m Internet Buy, BBC NEWS, July 19, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ 
business/4695495.stm. 
 42. One recent estimate places Facebook’s market value between $1.3 billion and $2.3 billion.  
Owen Thomas, Facebook’s New Value: $1.3 Billion?, VALLEYWAG, Dec. 15, 2008, http://valleywag. 
gawker.com/5106128/facebooks-new-value-13-billion.  Needless to say, recent turmoil in the stock 
market complicates these estimates.  Early in 2008, observers routinely cited a $15 billion figure.  See, 
e.g., Katrina Chan, How Much Is Facebook Really Worth?, MOTLEY FOOL, Feb. 14, 2008, http://www. 
fool.com/investing/high-growth/2008/02/14/how-much-is-facebook-really-worth.aspx; Posting of Adam 
Ostrow to Mashable, The Facebook Valuation Debate: IPO Highly Unlikely Before 2010, 
http://mashable.com/2008/02/14/facebook-valuation-2/ (Feb. 14, 2008). 
 43. See Posting of Om Malik to GigaOM, Why Facebook Connect Matters and Why It Will Win, 
http://gigaom.com/2008/07/23/facebook-connect/ (July 23, 2008, 22:19 PT) (“[Facebook] makes no 
bones about trying to build a platform that allows it to offer branded advertising in a manner akin to 
Google’s Adsense.”).  
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tion, gender, age, political views, relationship status, or other keywords, 
and to aim advertisements at users who fit these profiles.44  In doing so, 
they followed a familiar and successful blueprint for internet advertis-
ing.45  Most advertising-driven sites have developed increasingly sophisti-
cated mechanisms to target messages based on such individual characte-
ristics.  Google illustrates this progression.  The company famously began 
selling paid search advertisements, which allowed for the placement of 
advertisements relevant to precisely the user’s objective, based on the 
search query entered.46  Then, in 2004, Google began targeting adver-
tisements based on the content of messages sent through its Gmail ser-
vice.47  Most recently, Google has encouraged users of its many services 
to register for accounts that aggregate information about an individual’s 
activities across all the company’s platforms, including maps, searches, 
blogs, e-mail, word processing, and now even telephone service.48 
So far, however, the extraordinary size of social networks and their 
access to users’ personal information have not translated into revenue 
that justifies huge market valuations.49  Display ads on MySpace, Face-
book, and the social networking site Bebo sell for only thirteen cents for 
every thousand times the ad is served (CPM, or cost per thousand).50  By 
 
 44. See Caroline McCarthy, MySpace Gets ‘Hyper’ with Targeted Ads, CNET NEWS, Nov. 5, 
2007, http://news.cnet.com/8301-13577_3-9810771-36.html (reporting MySpace’s announcement of ad-
vertising program called “‘HyperTargeting,’ which uses the information that members put in their pro-
files to serve up ads they might actually want to see”); Facebook, Facebook Advertising, http://www. 
facebook.com/advertising/ (last visited May 26, 2009) (encouraging advertisers to “[r]each your exact 
audience and connect real customers to your business”). 
 45. See NIR VULKAN, THE ECONOMICS OF E-COMMERCE 25 (2003). 
 46. JOHN BATTELLE, THE SEARCH 123–24 (2005). 
 47. Id. at 194. 
 48. See Miguel Helft, Google’s Free Phone Manager Could Threaten a Variety of Services, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 12, 2009, at B9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/12/technology/internet/ 
12google.html; Rex Crum, No End in Sight for Microsoft-Google War, MARKETWATCH, Oct. 15, 2008, 
http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/no-end-sight-microsoft-google-war/story.aspx?guid=% 
7BA5D6279D-40A9-4AEB-9835-C003D296A841%7D&dist=msr_2 (describing Google’s business 
efforts to become a centralized place to find information, so that “Google is able to collect more in-
formation directly from consumers and tailor its advertising efforts”). 
 49. See Chan, supra note 42; Peter Kafka, News Corp: Selling Ads for MySpace Is Hard Work!, 
BUS. INSIDER, May 7, 2008, http://www.alleyinsider.com/2008/5/news_corp_don_t_worry_about_ 
revenue_myspace_is_doing_great; Ostrow, supra note 42.  Even Google, which entered an advertising 
partnership with MySpace in 2006, has been unable to solve the puzzle of extracting advertising reve-
nue from social networks.  See Posting of Michael Arrington to TechCrunch, Fox Said to Be Exploring 
Termination of Google Advertising Deal, http://www.techcrunch.com/2008/02/25/fox-exploring-
termination-of-google-advertising-deal/ (Feb. 25, 2008).  Google founder Sergey Brin summed up the 
slow progress: 
I don’t think we have the killer best way to advertise and monetize the social networks yet.  
We’re running lots of experiments.  We had some significant improvements but as I said, some of 
the things we were working on in Q4 didn’t really pan out and there were some disappointments 
there. 
Google, 2007 Q4 Earnings Conference Call (Jan. 31, 2008), http://investor.google.com/webcast.html 
(follow respective Webcast hyperlink) (transcript available at http://seekingalpha.com/article/62591-
google-q4-2007-earnings-call-transcript). 
 50. Kevin Kelleher, MySpace and Friends Need to Make Money. And Fast., WIRED, Mar. 24, 
2008, http://www.wired.com/techbiz/it/magazine/16-04/bz_socialnetworks (“[O]ne social networking 
metric is distinctly underwhelming: the one with a dollar sign.”).  One exception is the social network-
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comparison, big traditional media companies such as CBS and NBC 
charge CPM rates of between fifty and seventy-five dollars on affiliated 
sites.51  Many observers believe that targeted advertising has worked 
poorly in social networking contexts because it diverges from a visitor’s 
purpose of interacting with friends; in sharp contrast, Google presents 
ads precisely when someone is searching for a related item.52 
Given the enormous market pressure to improve these revenue 
numbers, it seems inevitable that social network sites will turn to social 
marketing as a means to improve the effectiveness of the advertising they 
carry.  The arrival of an economic recession might slow down what pre-
viously appeared to be an imminent shift, because advertisers may con-
serve their budgets and take fewer risks.53  Yet the potential of social 
marketing and the weak performance of other efforts to monetize social 
networking surely point in the same direction.  Put another way: if your 
revenue-starved business possessed advertisers’ “Holy Grail,” wouldn’t 
you give them a sip?  The next Section discusses social marketing and 
Facebook’s initial foray into the field. 
C. Social Marketing and the Example of Facebook Ads 
Because the concept is still new, this Article broadly defines the 
term “social marketing” as any technique that sends information about 
an ordinary individual’s interaction with a product to that person’s 
friends and acquaintances in order to stimulate demand for that product.  
Social marketing relies on the existing relationship between customers 
and their friends as a conduit for an advertising message. 
To oversimplify somewhat,54 there can be two basic structures for 
social marketing, depicted by the diagrams below.55  Under the first struc-
ture—which was the only kind realistically possible before the rise of new 
social networking technology—a vendor suggested or encouraged the 
customer to tell friends about a product.  This is what happens, for ex-
 
ing site LinkedIn, which can charge much higher CPM rates in part because it is aimed at profession-
als.  Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See, e.g., Bill Houghton, Social Networks’ Failed Advertising Strategy, SEMINAL, Apr. 15, 
2008, http://www.theseminal.com/2008/04/15/social-networks-failed-advertising-strategy/; Kafka, supra 
note 49; Scott Karp, Why Traditional Advertising Formats Fail on the Web, PUBLISHING 2.0, May 24, 
2008, http://publishing2.com/2008/05/24/why-traditional-advertising-formats-fail-on-the-web/. 
 53. See Emily Steel, Marketers Cut Back on Digital Media; Budgets for Videogames, Cellphones, 
Other New Formats Fall Victim to Downturn, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2008, at B6 (“Financial woes likely 
will derail the growth of a slew of advertising technologies that until recently were being hailed as the 
next big thing.”).  But see Story, supra note 2 (reporting, in 2007, that “[e]xecutives from consumer 
brand companies attending the [Facebook Ads launch] announcement said they viewed ads on social 
networking sites as a priority in their ad spending”). 
 54. For somewhat more complex variations on these structures, see infra notes 276–79 and ac-
companying text. 
 55. Many thanks to Mike Minehart for assistance with these diagrams. 
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ample, when marketers offer discounts or other incentives for referring 
friends to the business. 
FIGURE 1 
SOCIAL MARKETING VIA SUGGESTION 
 
This structure exists online as well.  Most new online interaction 
tools such as social networks or microblogging rely on purely voluntary 
communication.  Before transmitting personal information such as a sta-
tus update on Facebook or a tweet on Twitter, a user must compose the 
text and then push the button to send it.  Users choose the content and 
timing of these communications.  Much social marketing falls into the 
same category, as depicted in Figure 1.  If a vendor encourages customers 
to post positive reviews or to feature new purchases in a social network-
ing profile, then users divulge information intentionally.  Figure 1 also 
represents the flow of information in viral marketing, because the cus-
tomer, not the marketer, chooses to forward communication to friends. 
Some see this structure as a shortcoming. One prominent analyst 
called it “distorted” because “[e]ndorsements are now passed from 
trusted customers to prospects, not directly from the brands them-
selves.”56  In a Web 2.0 environment, however, marketers can overcome 
this “distortion.”  If they can identify the customer’s friends without as-
sistance from the customer, then they can send a message to those friends 
directly.  Marketers can then tell the friends about the customer’s inter-
actions with the product such as browsing and buying.  Figure 2 depicts 
this information flow. 
 
 56. Laura Petrecca & Jon Swartz, Marketers to Capitalize on Facebook Connections, USA 
TODAY, Nov. 7, 2007, at 3B (quoting Jeremiah Owyang, an analyst at Forrester Research). 
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FIGURE 2 
AUTOMATED DIRECT SOCIAL MARKETING 
 
Social marketing structured as shown in Figure 2 “cuts out the mid-
dleman”—although the middleman here happens to be the subject of the 
personal information and the one supposedly providing an endorsement 
of the product.  Marketers using this method can overcome reluctance or 
inertia on the part of customers to forward word-of-mouth messages.  
They gain control over the precise content and appearance of the mes-
sage.  Marketers can also provide a link within the message to entice re-
cipients into trying their wares.  And they can track the results with pre-
cision. 
Social marketing appeals to marketers for a range of reasons.  Mar-
keters can improve the targeting of a message to consumers likely to buy 
a product (because friends are more likely to have similar tastes).  They 
can attract the recipient’s attention more effectively (because messages 
from friends may stand out amid marketing clutter).  They can overcome 
the problem that ads are unrelated to a user’s purpose in visiting a social 
networking site (because the messages embed advertising within that so-
cial interaction).  Perhaps most important, social marketing increases the 
persuasiveness of the message (because piggybacking on the credibility 
of the recipient’s friend turns the message into a trusted referral or some-
thing close to one; it implicitly functions as an endorsement of the prod-
uct). 
The best concrete example of social marketing so far has been the 
initiative by Facebook, particularly its Beacon feature.57  This Article 
 
 57. Facebook has changed the terminology it uses to refer to its social marketing and advertising 
programs several times, which can cause confusion.  This Article adheres to the original language, 
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uses Facebook Ads as an example, even though techniques will evolve in 
the future and this specific program does not fully delimit the boundaries 
of social marketing. 
The company unveiled Facebook Ads in November 2007 with two 
components.58  One of them, Social Ads, allowed businesses to create 
pages within Facebook, much as an individual would.  When a user inter-
acts with an advertiser’s page, such as “becoming a fan” of a particular 
band, publication, politician, or product, a story is transmitted to that us-
er’s Facebook friends alerting them and inviting them to “become a fan” 
as well.59  Because it involved only activities within the Facebook envi-
ronment, the Social Ads initiative was not very controversial.  The only 
purpose of “becoming a fan” within Facebook is to add that designation 
to your profile, so it represents an intentional public endorsement.  Social 
Ads thus fall within Figure 1. 
Beacon was different.  It sent messages within Facebook about a us-
er’s actions on sites outside of Facebook.  So, to take Facebook’s own ex-
ample of how the program worked: Meaghan, an average Facebook user, 
might rate a movie at the website of Blockbuster Video.60  The Blockbus-
ter site would then send a query to Facebook’s servers and find out 
whether Meaghan was logged into Facebook.61  If so, a small pop-up win-
dow would appear on the bottom right of Meaghan’s screen notifying her 
that Blockbuster would send a message to the News Feeds of her Face-
book friends.62  The corner of the pop-up window included a place to 
click “No Thanks.”  This notification was unobtrusive and disappeared 
quickly, however, and many users did not realize the disclosure was made 
until after the fact.63  Unless the user opted out, Blockbuster sent a pro-
motional message to the News Feeds of all Meaghan’s Facebook friends 
with a statement such as, “Meaghan gave a 4-star rating to the movie Top 
Gun,” alongside the photo from Meaghan’s Facebook profile, a Block-
buster advertising message, and a hyperlink that would allow the recip-
ient to rent Top Gun from Blockbuster.64 
 
which referred to “Facebook Ads” as the overarching social marketing initiative and to “Beacon” and 
“Social Ads” as its two components. 
 58. Press Release, supra note 15. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See Story, supra note 2 (using Blockbuster example); Googins, supra note 4 (same). 
 61. For an excellent blog post explaining Beacon’s code and how it operated, see Posting of Jay 
Goldman to Radiant Core, Deconstructing Facebook Beacon JavaScript, http://www.radiantcore.com/ 
blog/archives/23/11/2007/deconstructingfacebookbeaconjavascript (Nov. 23, 2007, 17:00).  I am also 
grateful to Jesse Cheng for his assistance in understanding the mechanics of Beacon. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See Morganstern, supra note 4, at 183–84; Christopher Caldwell, Intimate Shopping, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 23, 2007, (Magazine), at 13.    When a user returned to the Facebook page, that site would 
notify the user that “Blockbuster.com is sending a story to your profile,” but this message did not in-
clude another opportunity to opt out.  See Posting of Charlene Li to Forrester Research Groundswell 
Blog, http://blogs.forrester.com/groundswell/2007/11/close-encounter.html (Nov. 21, 2007, 14:46) 
(showing a screenshot). 
 64. A screenshot illustrating this sample message is on file with author. 
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When Facebook launched Beacon, it claimed partnerships with six-
ty advertisers including not only Blockbuster but also CBS, Chase, Coca-
Cola, Microsoft, Sony Pictures Television, and Verizon Wireless.65  The 
press release announcing the program highlighted advertising partners’ 
enthusiasm for Beacon and its ability to add a level of “trust” to adver-
tisements.66  Beacon allows advertisers to harness word of mouth and 
“turn a user’s preferences into an endorsement with commercial value.”67  
Zuckerberg, the notoriously hyperbolic founder of Facebook, called this 
system “a completely new way of advertising online” and declared: “For 
the last hundred years media has been pushed out to people, but now 
marketers are going to be a part of the conversation.”68 
Users felt less enthusiastic about Beacon.  They complained that the 
system often revealed personal information to a user’s friends without 
the user’s knowledge or consent.69  The political organization Move-
On.org created a Facebook group called “Facebook: Stop Invading My 
Privacy.”70  More than 30,000 members joined in the first week,71 and 
eventually the group’s page reported that it had around 80,000 mem-
bers.72  As the controversy grew, some of the original Beacon partners 
put a hold on their participation, though they did not back out complete-
ly.73 
A month later, Facebook responded to the backlash by apologizing 
and reconfiguring Beacon.74  In the new version, rather than sending 
messages to Facebook automatically, a window appears on the screen 
asking permission to “tell your friends in Facebook” about an action  
 
 65. See Press Release, supra note 15. 
 66. Press Release, Facebook, Leading Websites Offer Facebook Beacon for Social Distribution 
(Nov. 6, 2007), http://www.facebook.com/press/releases.php?p=9166 (“In a marketplace where trust 
and reputation are crucial to success, giving sellers the ability to easily alert their network of friends—
the people who already know and trust them—to an item for sale has the potential to be a powerful 
tool.”). 
 67. Ellen Nakashima, Feeling Betrayed, Facebook Users Force Site to Honor Their Privacy, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2007, at A1. 
 68. Press Release, supra note 15. 
 69. See, e.g., Caldwell, supra note 63; Ellen Lee, Facebook Apologizes for New Ad System, S.F. 
CHRONICLE, Dec. 6, 2007, at C1; Nakashima, supra note 67; Louise Story & Brad Stone, Facebook 
Retreats on Online Tracking, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2007, at C1; Jessica Guynn, Saving Face over Face-
book Faux Pas, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2007, http://articles.latimes.com/2007/dec/06/business/fi-
facebook6. 
 70. Facebook, Petition: Facebook, Stop Invading My Privacy!, http://www.facebook.com/group. 
php?gid=5930262681 (last visited May 26, 2009) [hereinafter MoveOn Petition]; Jessica Guynn, Latest 
Target of MoveOn: Facebook, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2007, http://articles.latimes.com/2007/nov/21/ 
business/fi-facebook21. 
 71. Steven Levy, Do Real Friends Share Ads?, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 10, 2007, at 30. 
 72. MoveOn Petition, supra note 70. 
 73. Lee, supra note 69; Guynn, supra note 69; Posting of Louise Story to New York Times Bits 
Blog, Coke Is Holding Off on Sipping Facebook’s Beacon, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/11/30/ 
coke-is-holding-off-on-sipping-facebooks-beacon/ (Nov. 30, 2007, 15:53). 
 74. Posting of Mark Zuckerberg to The Facebook Blog, http://blog.facebook.com/blog. 
php?post=7584397130 (Dec. 5, 2007, 9:00).  Just a week earlier, Facebook executives had defended 
Facebook Ads and insisted that they would not offer a blanket opt-out to users.  Story & Stone, supra 
note 69. 
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taken on a partner site.  Without that authorization, the site does not 
send any social marketing message.  In other words, the company 
changed the program’s structure from the one depicted in Figure 2 to 
that in Figure 1—a more old-fashioned model where a marketer suggests 
that a customer transmit word of mouth to friends, but the decision to in-
itiate that message remains with the individual and not the marketer.  
Facebook also overhauled the site’s privacy settings so that users could 
opt out of Social Ads and Beacon altogether. 
Despite the failure of Facebook Ads to raise revenue, intensive dis-
cussion continues within the industry about the promise of social market-
ing.75  Facebook itself is preparing to “reboot” the concept of social mar-
keting with a new feature, which it began rolling out in December 2008, 
called Facebook Connect.76  The feature allows users to log in at other 
sites using their Facebook identity and to transport their social network 
with them to the external site.  MySpace, Google, and other major play-
ers are developing similar identity management initiatives that will com-
pete in this space, giving birth to the next generation of social market-
ing.77  This evolution underscores the fact that Facebook Ads were only 
an early and somewhat crude attempt to engage in social marketing.78  
The analysis in the remainder of this Article anticipates the eventual 
emergence of new social marketing endeavors as nearly inevitable and 
considers the shape of an appropriate legal response. 
 
 75. See, e.g., Posting of Justin Smith to Inside Facebook, Facebook’s New Social Video Ad Unit 
Is an Engagement Magnet, http://www.insidefacebook.com/2008/08/14/facebooks-new-social-video-ad-
unit-is-an-engagement-magnet/ (Aug. 14, 2008); Posting of Meghan Keane to Wired Epicenter, Face-
book’s New Social Ads Turn Your Friends into Marketers, http://blog.wired.com/business/2008/08/ 
your-facebook-n.html (Aug. 20, 2008, 16:38), Posting of Will M to All Facebook, Facebook’s Tim 
Kendall on the Future of Monetization, http://www.allfacebook.com/2008/08/facebooks-tim-kendall-
on-future-of-monetization/ (Aug, 20, 2008, 10:52). 
 76. See Stone, supra note 6; Posting of Mark Zuckerberg to Facebook Blog, Facebook Across the 
Web, http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=41735647130 (Dec. 4, 2008, 14:18); see also Leggatt, su-
pra note 6 (discussing Facebook’s other more recent social marketing efforts); Posting of Dave Morin 
to Facebook Developer, Announcing Facebook Connect, http://developers.facebook.com/news. 
php?blog=1&story=108 (May 9, 2008, 12:32) (previewing the soft launch of Facebook Connect). 
 77. MySpace Developer Platform, Category: MySpaceID, http://wiki.developer.myspace.com/ 
index.php?title=Category:MySpaceID (last visited May 26, 2009); Google Code, Open Social, 
http://code.google.com/apis/opensocial/ (last visited May 26, 2009); see Stone, supra note 6; MySpace 
Embraces Data Portability, Partners with Yahoo, Ebay, and Twitter, TECHCRUNCH, May 8, 2008, 
http://www.techcrunch.com/2008/05/08/myspace-embraces-data-portability-partners-with-yahoo-ebay-
and-twitter/. 
 78. The well-known technology blogger Om Malik characterized Facebook Connect as “like  
Facebook Beacon—minus the marketing sleaziness.”  Posting of Om Malik to GigaOM, Social Web’s 
Big Question: Federate or Aggregate?, http://gigaom.com/2008/11/30/social-webs-big-question-
federate-or-aggregate/ (Nov. 20, 2008, 22:08 PT). 
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II. POTENTIAL CONCERNS ABOUT SOCIAL MARKETING 
A. Disclosure Concerns 
Probably the most evident concern raised by social marketing is the 
potential threat of unauthorized and undesired disclosures of particular 
pieces of personal information.  Social marketing depends on a flow of 
information from the customer featured in an endorsement message to 
that customer’s friends.  The ads function only by revealing that the en-
dorser bought a certain shirt, browsed on a certain page, or signed up to 
receive news about a certain musician.  But some people might not want 
information about their browsing and shopping shared automatically 
with a large number of others, and particularly with their friends. 
The controversy surrounding the introduction of Facebook Ads fo-
cused almost entirely on such disclosure concerns.  Both Facebook and 
opponents of Beacon framed the pertinent issues as “privacy.”79  Media 
coverage also highlighted unwanted disclosures of personal information.80  
Similarly, legal claims against Beacon have all taken this approach thus 
far.  Two class action lawsuits filed in the United States center on the 
program’s allegedly unlawful disclosure of personal information, based 
on a variety of theories grounded in data privacy law.81  A regulatory 
complaint against Facebook in Canada likewise focuses on the site’s col-
lection and disclosure of personal information, purportedly in violation 
of that nation’s stringent data protection law.82 
Many users found it “creepy” that Facebook transmitted informa-
tion in the News Feed without asking for specific permission first.83  But 
just because a disclosure was unintended does not necessarily make it 
problematic, much less a cognizable legal injury.  Unpacking exactly 
what led to feelings of “creepiness” about Beacon helps define more 
clearly what serious disclosure concerns might arise from social market-
ing, as opposed to mere discomfort or uncertainty.  I see four distinct 
(though overlapping) concerns about disclosure. 
First, some categories of information enjoy special sensitivity across 
the board.  As we shall see, most privacy law, and especially U.S. law, re-
cognizes far stronger rights against disclosures within defined classes of 
 
 79. Press Release, supra note 15; MoveOn Petition, supra note 70. 
 80. See sources cited supra note 69. 
 81. Lane Complaint, supra note 7, at 1; Amended Complaint, Harris v. Blockbuster, Inc., No. 
2:08-cv-00155-DF (E.D. Tex. June 3, 2008) [hereinafter Harris Complaint] (suing Blockbuster only). 
 82. See Complaint of Phillippa Lawson et al. to Can. Privacy Comm’n (May 30, 2008), 
http://www.cippic.ca/uploads/CIPPICFacebookComplaint_29May08.pdf [hereinafter Lawson Com-
plaint]. 
 83. See, e.g., Googins, supra note 4; IdeaLog, Facebook Super Creeped Me Out Tonight, 
http://www.idealog.us/2008/07/facebook-super.html (July 16, 2008, 1:18); Posting of Adam Ostrow to 
Mashable, Report: Facebook Might Make Beacon Less Creepy, http://mashable.com/2007/11/29/ 
facebook-beacon/ (Nov. 29, 2007); Posting of David Weinberger to Huffington Post, Facebook’s Pri-
vacy Default, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-weinberger/facebooks-privacy-defaul_b_72687. 
html (Nov. 14, 2007, 17:48 EST) (“I find myself creeped out by this system . . . .”). 
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particularly intimate topics.84  These presumptively private topics include 
medical, sexual, financial, or political matters.  In principle, future social 
marketing initiatives could transmit a user’s implied endorsement of anti-
diarrhea medicine, condoms, emergency mortgage counseling, or an 
anarchist group.  Though such disclosures might seem the most obviously 
and seriously troubling, in reality, they are extremely unlikely.  No Bea-
con partner sites focused on such sensitive topics.  Moreover, this sales 
technique appears ill-suited to extremely personal information.  Compa-
nies that collect extra-sensitive data tread very carefully to avoid alarm-
ing customers, regardless of whether they are legally required to do so.85 
A second and related concern is that social marketing might im-
pinge on what Neil Richards has called “intellectual privacy.”86  Automat-
ically publicizing a user’s choice of books, music, films, or web sites (and 
especially those a user has merely browsed) would constrain the capacity 
to explore ideas freely.87  Introducing its anti-Beacon petition, Move-
On.org invoked the specter of disclosures that could invade one’s 
thought processes: “When you buy a book or movie online—or make a 
political contribution—do you want that information automatically 
shared with the world on Facebook?  Most people would call that a huge 
invasion of privacy.”88  In contrast to the inherently personal topics noted 
above, some original Beacon partner sites related to the development of 
ideas or self-expression, including those affiliated with Blockbuster, CBS, 
Fandango, and The New York Times.89  This concern regarding intellec-
tual privacy appears more realistic than the concern for extremely inti-
mate information. 
Third, in some circumstances users may not want to reveal certain 
pieces of personal information to particular acquaintances.  Messages 
broadcast to all friends undermine fine-grained individual choices.  For 
 
 84. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S. Private 
Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497, 515 (1995). 
 85. As an extreme example, consider the privacy policy for Bedpost, a site where users can track 
information about their sexual encounters: 
We understand that this is potentially the most personal of data-sets you will ever keep outside of 
financial records.  The records you save here will never be viewed by us nor will it ever be sold or 
provided to a third party.  This information is permanently delete-able by you, should you deem it 
necessary. 
See Bedpost, Privacy Policy, http://bedposted.com/ (last visited May 26, 2009); see also, e.g., Google 
Health, Google Health Privacy Policy, http://www.google.com/intl/en-US/health/privacy.html (last  
visited May 26, 2009) (describing similar rules for sharing and deleting medical information). 
 86. Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 387 (2008) (discussing First 
Amendment implications of "intellectual privacy—the protection of records of our intellectual activi-
ties”). 
 87. Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at “Copyright Management in 
Cyberspace,” 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 1003–19 (1996); Richards, supra note 86, at 434–37. 
 88. MoveOn.org, Facebook Must Respect Privacy, http://www.civic.moveon.org/ 
facebookprivacy/ (last visited May 26, 2009).  As to privacy of political contributions, see generally 
William McGeveran, Mrs. McIntyre’s Checkbook: Privacy Costs of Political Contribution Disclosure, 6 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1 (2003). 
 89. See Press Release, supra note 66 (listing Beacon partner sites). 
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example, some of the best-publicized negative response to Beacon arose 
from ruined surprise gifts; because the program was rolled out in No-
vember, many users were doing their Christmas shopping, and Facebook 
Ads revealed the purchase of presents to their intended recipients.90  
More generally, someone who wears sweater sets by day and combat 
boots by night may prefer these two aspects of her identity to remain 
separate.  What if she only uses a social network professionally but social 
marketing techniques send messages related to her nightlife?  Or college 
students and other young people may fail to recognize how many people 
beyond their peers can see their profile on a site like Facebook.91  Even 
information about seemingly mundane purchases such as clothing can 
breach these separations.  As one commenter objected on the MoveOn 
protest page, “I don’t know about everyone else, but I’m not looking 
forward to the day where I have to constantly be on alert as to if what 
I’m doing online is being shared with all my family, friends, and co-
workers.”92  This version of the disclosure concern also appears justified.  
And although overly broad disclosures will cause no more than inconve-
nience or discomfort in many situations, they could result in significant 
privacy harms. 
Finally, beyond these specific examples of especially sensitive top-
ics, “intellectual” content, and unwanted disclosures to particular indi-
viduals, the very possibility of unintentional disclosure can cause more 
pervasive problems.  Jerry Kang compared earlier forms of online track-
ing to being followed through the mall by a private detective taking 
notes.93  When Facebook first unveiled Beacon, David Weinberger of-
fered a similar metaphor of a couple talking quietly as they walked down 
the street, only to discover recordings of their conversation posted on the 
internet.94  In both instances, semipublic communication is removed from 
its original context and placed in a much more widely available setting.  
In other words, regardless of the particular nature of the information 
transferred, the pre-reform Beacon violated implicit social norms about 
 
 90. See, e.g., Caldwell, supra note 63, at 13; Nakashima, supra note 67; Tom Regan, Facebook 
Faces Up to Privacy Concerns—Again, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 12, 2007, at 16; Story & Stone, 
supra note 69; Guynn, supra note 69. 
 91. See Grimmelmann, supra note 36, manuscript at 20–22. 
 92. Posting of Ansley to Facebook, Facebook, Stop Invading My Privacy!, This Group is Awe-
some! Good Call, MoveOn.org, http://www.facebook.com/topic.php?uid=5930262681&topic=3630 
(Nov. 22, 2007, 23:31). 
 93. Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1198–99 
(1998); see also Caldwell, supra note 63, at 13 (“We used to live in a world where if someone secretly 
followed you from store to store, recording your purchases, it would be considered impolite and even 
weird.  Today, such an option can be redefined [by Facebook Beacon] as ‘default’ behavior.”). 
 94. Posting of David Weinberger to Huffington Post, supra note 83 (“The couple would feel vi-
olated not only because their ‘information’—their conversation—was published but because they had 
the expectation that even though their sound waves were physically available to anyone walking on the 
street who cared to listen, norms prevent us from doing so. . . . Our expectation is that our transactions 
at one site are neither to be made known to other sites nor made known to our friends.”). 
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disclosure and aggregation of personal information.95  By flouting those 
norms, Beacon contributes to a pervasive sense of surveillance and its at-
tendant discomfort and constraint.96  As sociologists have long under-
stood, we rely on the presumptive privacy of certain activities, both on-
line and off, to give us “down time” from living on display.97  Users who 
are unsure whether activities will be reported to their friends can be ex-
pected to act differently, leading to some of the same pernicious self-
censorship effects of monitoring that make intellectual privacy impor-
tant.98 
One standard response to all of these concerns stresses that only an 
endorser’s chosen friends receive the disclosures from social marketing.99  
According to its defenders, social marketing inherently limits the au-
dience to one defined by and known to the endorsers, eliminating or at 
least reducing drastically the privacy impact of disclosures.  This argu-
ment is backwards, however.  Far from reducing privacy concerns, exist-
ing relationships between the endorser and the recipients of social mar-
keting heighten the privacy salience of disclosures in the ads. 
We should and do recognize some infringement of privacy interests 
arising from disclosures made to complete strangers.100  But both law and 
social conventions recognize a higher—not a lower—degree of privacy in 
communications with friends and family members.101  As Charles Fried 
has explained, unwanted disclosures to friends interfere with selective 
revelation, the process of increasing intimacy gradually by disclosing 
pieces of personal information over time.102 
Furthermore, as noted above, not all “friends” are created equal, 
online or in real life.  Any individual’s social life actually consists of in-
terlocking groups with different norms, roles, and relationships that re-
 
 95. See Grimmelmann, supra note 36, manuscript at 24–25; Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Con-
textual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119 (2004). 
 96. See OSCAR GANDY, THE PANOPTIC SORT (1993); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy 
in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1647–67 (1999). 
 97. See, e.g., ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959); ALAN 
WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 23–51 (1967). 
 98. See Richards, supra note 86, at 425 (“Intellectual privacy thus permits us to experiment with 
ideas in relative seclusion without having to disclose them before we have developed them, considered 
them, and decided whether to adopt them as our own.”); Schwartz, supra note 96, at 1647 (summariz-
ing ways that concern created by pervasive internet monitoring will constrain democratic deliberation, 
self-governance, and related values). 
 99. See Privacy Implications of Online Advertising: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation, 110th Cong. 3–5 (2008) [hereinafter Kelly Testimony] (testimony of Chris 
Kelly, Chief Privacy Officer, Facebook) http://commerce.senate.gov/public/_files/ 
ChrisKellyFacebookOnlinePrivacyTestimony.pdf (“Social Ads are only presented to confirmed 
friends as opposed to the world at large . . . .”); Anick Jesdanun & Rachel Metz, Facebook Users Raise 
Privacy Complaints over New Tracking,  USA TODAY, Nov. 22, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/ 
news/internetprivacy/2007-11-22-facebook-tracking_N.htm (“Information is shared with a small selec-
tion of a user’s trusted network of friends, not publicly on the Web or with all Facebook users.”). 
 100. See Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Surveillance, and Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 245, 245, 249–50 
(2008). 
 101. See id. at 251. 
 102. See Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 489–90 (1968). 
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sult in different levels of intimacy and disclosure as well as different ex-
pectations of discretion or privacy.103  As any user of social networking 
sites would testify, it can be awkward to reject a request to become 
friends.  Thus, social networks of supposed “friends” are also populated 
by relatives, professional colleagues, neighbors, former classmates or co-
workers, and many casual acquaintances.104  All the people in these undif-
ferentiated groups have not formed identical relationships in real space.  
Yet most online social networking sites have been built for all-or-nothing 
sharing.  Facebook and MySpace have features that allow users to seg-
ment their friends into different lists for different purposes,105 but it is not 
clear if these subnetworks would interact with social marketing.  After 
all, marketers want to reach every potential customer whom the en-
dorsement can influence, not just a portion of them. 
Another reply to disclosure concerns suggests that users of social 
networks, especially younger users, simply have particularly relaxed pre-
ferences about information privacy.106  Those who do not like sharing 
personal information, the argument runs, should just abstain from online 
social networking.  Even if it were true at one time, the caricature of so-
cial network users as a young exhibitionist fringe no longer reflects reali-
ty.  First, the number of users involved places online social networks 
firmly in the mainstream: one-third of adult internet users and two-thirds 
of online teenagers have profiles on social networking sites.107  Because 
adults account for a much larger proportion of the population, they ac-
tually compose the majority of social network users.108  In addition, em-
pirical research demonstrates that the majority of both older and young-
er users consciously protect their privacy in their use of social 
networks.109  Finally, as social media functionality spreads rapidly to oth-
 
 103. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 
948–59 (2005). 
 104. See Posting of Ansley to Facebook, supra note 92; Posting of Amanda Lenhart to Pew-
Internet, Facebook Connect and a Failure to Understand Online Identity Management, http://www. 
pewinternet.org/PPF/p/1525/pipcomments.asp (Dec. 2, 2008, 11:31) (“In the offline world, we don’t 
present ourselves in the same way to all people in our lives—we show different sides of ourselves to 
our mothers, our friends, our employers.”). 
 105. See Posting of Justin Smith to Inside Facebook, Facebook Friend Lists Let You Manage 
Your “Friends” More Effectively, http://www.insidefacebook.com/2007/12/19/facebook-friend-lists-let-
you-manage-your-friends-more-effectively/ (Dec. 17, 2007); MySpace.com, Frequently Asked Ques-
tions, http://faq.myspace.com/ (search “Privacy” then follow “1. Control Privacy on MySpace profile 
2.0” hyperlink) (last visited May 26, 2009). 
 106. As The New York Times quoted one observer, “‘Isn’t this community getting a little hypo-
critical?,’ said Chad Stoller, director of emerging platforms at Organic, a digital advertising agency.  
‘Now, all of a sudden, they don’t want to share something?’”  Story & Stone, supra note 69. 
 107. Memorandum from Amanda Lenhart, Senior Research Specialist, Pew Internet & American 
Life Project, Adults and Social Network Websites, at 1 (Jan. 14, 2009), http://www.pewinternet.org/ 
~/medica//Files/Reports/2009/PIP_Adult_social_networking_data_memo_FINAL.pdf.pdf. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See id. at 9–11 (reporting that the majority of adult users of online social networks restrict 
access to their profiles and content and take other privacy-protective measures); Memorandum from 
Amanda Lenhart & Mary Madden, Senior Research Specialists, Pew Internet & American Life 
Project, Social Networking Websites and Teens, at 5 (Jan. 3, 2007), http://www.pewinternet.org/ 
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er parts of the web, rather than remaining segregated at particular sites 
dedicated to social networking, the entire internet will soon become 
more hospitable to social marketing techniques. 
Now that online social networking has become ubiquitous, especial-
ly among younger cohorts, it simply is not a realistic alternative to opt 
out altogether.110  Doing so would be like a teenager of a previous gener-
ation eschewing the telephone.  Moreover, opting out of online social 
networking can abdicate the ability to shape one’s own reputation—after 
all, friends and acquaintances will still discuss the abstainer and tag him 
or her in photos.111  For good or ill, platforms like MySpace and Face-
book are a crucial forum for everyone (and especially those under thirty-
five) to talk, organize social outings, play games, and hang the virtual 
posters that define oneself in the world—in short, to live.112  They must 
have a reasonable degree of confidence in their privacy when they do so. 
B. Information Quality Concerns 
Social marketing messages are a form of consumer endorsement as 
the Federal Trade Commission defines the term.113  The virtues of peer 
recommendations depend very much on their high perceived reliability 
and independence.114  Social marketing advertisements may not always 
share in this level of dependability and could convey exaggerated, mis-
leading, or even completely false information or endorsements.  Such 
claims could deceive a recipient into taking actions or making purchases 
that might not otherwise have occurred, thus distorting choices with bad 
information.  Worse, over time either inaccurate or overly frequent social 
marketing would seriously undermine the effectiveness of online word of 
mouth altogether.115  These concerns can be grouped together as worries 
about the information quality of social marketing. 
The baseline of a true endorsement should be defined as an accurate 
and voluntary declaration of support.  Accuracy is crucial, obviously, but 
 
~media//Files/Reports/2007/PIP_SNS_Data_Memo_Jan_2007.pdf.pdf (reporting similar data about 
teenagers). 
 110. See JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, BORN DIGITAL: UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST 
GENERATION OF DIGITAL NATIVES 36 (2008). 
 111. See Clive Thompson, I’m So Totally, Digitally Close to You, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2008, 
(Magazine), at 42, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/07/magazine/07awareness-t.html. 
 112. See Grimmelmann, supra note 36, manuscript at 11–17 (identifying social construction of 
identity, relationship, and community as key motivations for participation in online social networks). 
 113. Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising, 16 C.F.R. 
§ 255.0(b)(2008) (“[A]n endorsement means any advertising message (including verbal statements, 
demonstrations, or depictions of the name, signature, likeness or other identifying personal character-
istics of an individual or the name or seal of an organization) which message consumers are likely to 
believe reflects the opinions, beliefs, findings, or experience of a party other than the sponsoring ad-
vertiser.”). 
 114. See Goldman, supra note 9, at 410; KELLY, supra note 13, at 14; Smith et al., supra note 13, at 
32. 
 115. See Goldman, supra note 9, at 429. 
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can be difficult to measure.  Simplified social marketing messages may 
convert a mixed and nuanced view of a product into an apparent black-
and-white positive opinion.  Voluntariness ensures that an endorsement 
is freely given.  One might like a product perfectly well but still not 
enough to recommend it to others.  Even if the supposed endorsements 
embodied in social marketing messages fall far short of this level of en-
thusiasm, however, advertisers naturally want to portray them as sponta-
neous declarations of support. 
In principle, and depending on the design of a particular social mar-
keting system, users could trigger positive messages even if their opinions 
of an underlying product are neutral or negative.  If social marketing be-
came widespread, then messages could be sent when a user merely vi-
sited a web site, browsed merchandise, tried out a diversion such as a poll 
or quiz, or entered a contest.  Without much trouble one can imagine so-
cial marketing developing to the point where eager advertisers parlay 
routine online actions such as these into automated social marketing 
messages that imply endorsement.  Such endorsements, neither accurate 
nor voluntary, would pollute the overall information environment. 
A misleading implication might not require any direct falsehoods.  
Rather, the message “Joe answered the quiz at Acme.com, why don’t 
you try?” seeks to drive traffic to Acme’s web site by suggesting the 
thought, “my friend Joe took the time to take this quiz, so maybe I 
should too.”  The message does this even if Joe thought the quiz was rot-
ten after he finished it, or hates the actual products sold at Acme’s site, 
or never paid attention to the fact that Acme sponsored the quiz.  In-
deed, Facebook’s own promotional materials show how the video rental 
site Blockbuster used Facebook Ads to transmit messages to a user’s 
friends when a user rated movies on the company’s web site or Facebook 
page.116  Blockbuster essentially inserted a user’s name and image into an 
advertisement for the company and sent it to the user’s friends, even 
though that user may never have rented a movie from Blockbuster at all.  
Before reform of Beacon, this occurred without explicit permission from 
the user. 
Similarly, a user may have been browsing or buying for a particular 
purpose that does not indicate any genuine personal recommendation.  
People frequently consider or make purchases that do not match their 
true preferences.  Knowing that your most fashionable friend bought a 
certain shirt or your most well-read friend bought a certain book could 
serve as a strong recommendation for those items—unless the shirt ac-
tually was for an “ugly nerd” Halloween costume, the book was assigned 
class reading, or either one was a gift intended to match the recipient’s 
poor taste rather than the purchaser’s good taste.  The “ruined Christmas 
 
 116. See supra notes 60–64 and accompanying text. 
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presents” theme to much anti-Beacon commentary117 demonstrates the 
likelihood of this last example. 
Passive or automatic transmission of social marketing messages 
(that is, shifting from the model portrayed in Figure 1 to that in Figure 2) 
further intensifies this possible distortion.  Even if the endorser likes the 
advertiser’s products just fine, she might not have gone out of her way to 
say so.  An in-person recommendation to a friend, or even a general re-
view written on a blog, requires the endorser’s thought and volition.  Re-
cipients of these trusted referrals rely on them in part precisely because 
of their voluntariness.  Routinized social marketing messages, however, 
require no such effort or choice, which diminishes their value from heart-
felt true endorsements to mechanized impersonal advertisement. 
It is easy to understand the cumulative damage that would be 
caused by many inaccurate (or less than fully accurate) social marketing 
messages.  For a comparison, consider how advertisements for movies 
sometimes include favorable quotes, notoriously excerpting the only faint 
praise in an otherwise negative review.118  The practice became sufficient-
ly well-known to damage the efficacy of all such critic blurbs, even the 
entirely accurate ones.119  If social marketing messages become unreliable 
in this way, then it may prevent the promise of an online culture of rec-
ommendation from coming to fruition. 
These dangers intensify because removing the speed bump of an in-
dividual’s decision to tell friends about a product surely would increase 
the number of such messages.  Apart from any inaccuracy, if in-boxes be-
come cluttered with supposed endorsements from people we know, pre-
sumably the effectiveness will plummet.  The result could be the “spami-
fication” of social marketing.  Consumer attention to social marketing is 
a finite resource shared by all marketers; if they lack incentives or restric-
tions that prevent them from depleting that shared resource, the resulting 
overuse by at least some of them could cause a situation resembling a 
tragedy of the commons.120 
Apparent social marketing endorsements that do not fully reflect a 
person’s views also harm the supposed endorser by diluting his or her 
reputation and influence, both quantitatively (too many recommenda-
tions make each one less valuable) and qualitatively (recommendations 
the person would not have otherwise made can be unwise and may dis-
 
 117. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 118. See, e.g., Adam Conner-Simons, Don’t Quote Me, But…, GELF MAG., Sept. 21, 2007, 
http://www.gelfmagazine.com/archives/dont_quote_me_but.php. 
 119. Id. (“Many critics question whether blurbing even contributes to films’ success.”). 
 120. See Deven R. Desai, Property, Persona, and Preservation, 81 TEMPLE L. REV. (forthcoming 
2009), manuscript at 17–22, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1101648 
(discussing “attention economics” and viewing consumer attention as a scarce resource); Frank Pas-
quale, Copyright in an Era of Information Overload: Toward the Privileging of Categorizers, 60 VAND. 
L. REV. 135, 166–71 (2007) (discussing how information overload creates externalities similar to pollu-
tion). 
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courage the recipient from relying on that person’s opinion in the fu-
ture).  Many motivations inspire individuals to engage in word-of-mouth 
interactions, including desires to feel smart, to be helpful, to express 
themselves, or to affiliate themselves with groups that share their opin-
ions.121  Some individuals apparently serve as particularly strong “in-
fluencers” within their social circle.122  These influencers—from fashion-
forward clothes horses to early-adopter computer geeks—gain satisfac-
tion from starting trends or being the first among their acquaintances to 
try new products.  Recipients of all this word of mouth benefit as well, by 
gaining reliable sources for information and opinions about products: we 
all have knowledgeable friends whom we ask about purchasing decisions 
within their field of expertise.  No matter how enthusiastically he or she 
engages in word of mouth, however, each person has a limited fund of 
social capital to send information or make recommendations to friends.123  
Whatever a person’s level of influence, a large number of endorsements 
that are not fully voluntary will squander that influence.124 
The greatest danger of poor information quality arises in the aggre-
gate.  An individual social marketing message that misstates or overstates 
the supposed endorser’s level of support may only mislead its recipient 
into making an ill-advised individual purchasing decision.  Cumulatively, 
however, too many inaccurate endorsements—or even too many social 
marketing messages overall—will condition recipients to ignore all of 
them, good and bad.  Bad information could generate enough “noise” to 
drown out any accurate “signal” transmitted by social marketing.125  This 
spamification of social marketing would undermine the benefits of online 
 
 121. See SERNOVITZ, supra note 22, at 15–18. 
 122. See Abratt et al., supra note 23, at 32–34 (reviewing marketing literature concerning “market 
mavens”); Nicholas Casey & Bruce Orwall, Running Underground: To Sharpen Nike’s Edge, CEO 
Taps ‘Influencers;’ House Built by Athletes Hires a Tattoo Artist; Mr. Parker and the Twins, WALL ST. 
J., Oct. 24, 2007, at A1 (describing efforts by Nike to appeal to ‘influencers’ as a means of maintaining 
the brand’s edge).  But see Matthew Creamer, What’s Plaguing Viral Marketing, ADVERTISING AGE, 
July 16, 2007, at 1 (reporting on skeptics who believe influencers have more limited impact than some-
times suggested). 
 123. The 2008 redesign of Facebook recognized this fact more generally by restoring the ability 
for users to request less information about particular friends in the News Feed.  Posting of Nick 
O’Neill on AllFacebook, Facebook Furthers Attack on FriendFeed, Adds Comments to News Feed, 
http://www.allfacebook.com/2008/07/facebook-furthers-attack-on-friendfeed-adds-comments-to-news-
feed/ (July 31, 2008, 9:41). 
 124. Celebrities, of course, must also avoid overexposure that dilutes the influence of their repu-
tation in endorsements.  See Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 438 (Cal. 1979) (“[W]hile a 
judicious involvement in commercial promotions may have been perceived as an important ingredient 
in one’s career, uncontrolled exposure may be dysfunctional.”). 
 125. See XV OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 453, 454 (2d ed. 1989) (defining “signal-to-noise 
ratio” as “the ratio of the strength of a desired signal to that of unwanted noise interference, usu[ally] 
expressed in decibels; also transf. to non-electrical systems”); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech in 
Cyberspace from the Listener’s Perspective: Private Speech Restrictions, Libel, State Action, Harass-
ment, and Sex, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 377, 382–83 (using “signal to noise” synonymously with “ratios 
of wheat to chaff”). 
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word of mouth and possibly destroy systems already in existence that 
help users navigate the ocean of information available online.126 
C. Identity Control Concerns 
The final potential concern about social marketing is much more 
abstract and theoretical than the first two.  Those other concerns arise 
because the content of social marketing messages contributes to some 
other consequential harm.  Concerns about disclosure relate to the per-
sonal details that a customer’s friends might discover through social 
marketing and some of the injuries the customer might suffer as a result 
of that knowledge, such as embarrassment or awkwardness.  Information 
quality concerns derive largely from the possibility that the substance of 
a message might mislead or confuse consumers, or the danger that social 
marketing will contribute to information overload. 
Identity control concerns, in contrast, do not depend on other 
second-order harms.  Many commentators consider the exploitation of 
an individual’s reputation or persona for commercial purposes to be ob-
jectionable in itself.  Regardless of whether the information conveyed in 
the message is sensitive or misleading, nonconsensual reputational piggy-
backing may intrude on autonomy.  Moreover, observers often object in 
particularly strong terms when personal identity is unwittingly entangled 
in commercial marketing. In this view, such uses interfere with a legally 
protectable interest in “demarcating a space beyond the reach of market 
forces.”127 
The identity control concern dates back at least to the classic article 
by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis that first articulated a common 
law right to privacy.128  Their argument has often been cited to justify 
rules against particular embarrassing disclosures (as well as intrusive 
means of gathering information).  At root, however, Warren and Bran-
deis had a much broader conception of the “right ‘to be let alone.’”129  
They referred repeatedly to unauthorized publication of a photograph as 
an affront to the dignity of the individual, even if no other private details 
 
 126. Cf. SERNOVITZ, supra note 22, at 31–33 (comparing the danger that deceptive online word-
of-mouth practices might create consumer distrust to a similar phenomenon in spam). 
 127. Jonathan Kahn, Privacy as a Legal Principle of Identity Maintenance, 33 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 371, 373 (2003); see also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, We Are Symbols and Inhabit Symbols, So 
Should We Be Paying Rent? Deconstructing the Lanham Act and Rights of Publicity, 20 COLUM.-VLA 
J.L. & ARTS 123, 127 (1996) (noting desirability of legal protection for “those who do not want to hawk 
products, or to be seen as associated with or endorsing a particular manufacturer”); Robert C. Post, 
Rereading Warren and Brandeis: Privacy, Property, and Appropriation, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 647, 
676 (1991) (“[W]e must inquire whether we wish the law to create a social structure in which our very 
names and images have become alienable commodities.”). 
 128. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
 129. Id. at 195 (citing Thomas P. Cooley, COOLEY ON TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888)). 
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accompany the image.130  Courts and treatise writers may file disclosure 
and identity control concerns together under the “privacy” label because 
of their “family resemblance.”131  But identity control differs from disclo-
sure because identity could be implicated regardless of any specific in-
formation that might accompany a social marketing message. 
Different courts and commentators offer different (though overlap-
ping) accounts of the reasons for concern over identity control.132  At 
times this diversity borders on incoherence: as Stacey Dogan and Mark 
Lemley suggest, “[A] review of the cases and the literature reveals that 
no one seems to be able to explain exactly why individuals should have 
this right.”133 
Many have argued from various perspectives that an individual 
should be entitled to control the use of his or her own “persona” because 
it is an extension of the self.134  Warren and Brandeis hinted at this idea in 
general terms.135  Information associated with online personae such as so-
cial network profiles now shapes individual identity and reputation pro-
foundly.136  This may lead to dignitary harms from social marketing that 
interfere with the integrity of those online personae.137  Some, particular-
ly earlier in the tort’s development, also viewed an individual’s persona 
as the fruits of individual effort and relied on a form of Lockean labor 
 
 130. See id. at 195–96, 211, 213–14; see also Leon Green, The Right of Privacy, 27 ILL. L. REV. 237, 
244–46 (1932) (describing early cases that “definitely” establish liability for nonconsensual “commer-
cial, trade, or business use” of a plaintiff’s photograph). 
 131. See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1097–99 (2002) (using 
Wittgenstein’s concept of “family resemblances” to identify commonalities among many diverse inter-
ests usually classified as “privacy”). 
 132. Many scholars have examined rationales comprehensively, a task beyond the scope of this 
Article.  Indeed, the brief summary offered here ignores some important theoretical distinctions.  My 
only purpose is to identify a separate set of privacy-like concerns about social marketing, beyond dis-
closure of personal information.  For an overview of these debates about persona rights, see generally 
1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY §§ 2.1–2.9 (2d ed. 2009).  For 
some good examples of thorough critical treatment from a variety of perspectives, see, for example, 
Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from Trademark Law, 58 
STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1180–90 (2006); Lee Goldman, Elvis Is Alive, But He Shouldn’t Be: The Right of 
Publicity Revisited, 1992 BYU L. REV. 597, 603–13; Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: 
Commercial Exploitation of the Associative Value of Personality, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1199 (1986); Ro-
berta Rosenthal Kwall, Fame, 73 IND. L.J. 1 (1997); Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Im-
age: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125 (1993); Mark P. McKenna, The Right of 
Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 225 (2005). 
 133. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 132, at 1163. 
 134. See, e.g., Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean 
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 971 (1964) (defining right of “inviolate personality”); Alice Haemmer-
li, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE L.J. 383, 417–21 (1999) (arguing 
based on Kantian philosophy); McKenna, supra note 132, at 279–90 (defining right to “autonomous 
self-definition”). 
 135. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 128, at 195–96. 
 136. See Beth Simone Noveck, Trademark Law and the Social Construction of Trust: Creating the 
Legal Framework for Online Identity, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1733, 1737–38 (2005). 
 137. See McKenna, supra note 132, at 286–88 (comparing a false implication of endorsement to 
compelled speech and arguing that such implications rob individuals of the right to express themselves 
on their own terms). 
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theory to justify protection as a natural right.138  Perhaps this impact 
leads, or should lead, to a right of control over some aspects of public 
identity.139 
Probably the most dramatic expression of such objections based on 
natural rights or personal liberty came in the early case of Pavesich v. 
New England Life Insurance Company,140 involving the unauthorized use 
of the plaintiff’s photograph in an advertisement for insurance alongside 
an invented quote about his supposed purchase of an insurance policy:141 
The knowledge that one’s features and form are being used for such 
a purpose, and displayed in such places as such advertisements are 
often liable to be found, brings not only the person of an extremely 
sensitive nature, but even the individual of ordinary sensibility, to a 
realization that his liberty has been taken away from him; and, as 
long as the advertiser uses him for these purposes, he cannot be 
otherwise than conscious of the fact that he is for the time being 
under the control of another, that he is no longer free, and that he is 
in reality a slave, without hope of freedom, held to service by a 
merciless master . . . .142 
Setting aside the overheated rhetoric, bad social marketing practices 
could raise the very same concerns.  A message that appears to convey 
an individual’s commercial endorsement, even if it does not mislead reci-
pients, could interfere with this natural right to autonomy in the exploita-
tion of identity. 
In another vein, some commentators adhere to more economically 
oriented rationales.  Some of them argue that, as in copyright, the law 
should protect individuals’ incentives for the creation and maintenance 
of a coherent identity that embodies their reputation.143  Others 
straightforwardly suggest that the commercialization of individual identi-
 
 138. See, e.g., Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 216 
(1954) (arguing for right of publicity because an individual who develops an identity with pecuniary 
value deserves protection for an investment that required “considerable time, effort, skill, and even 
money”); see also Dogan & Lemley, supra note 132, at 1181–84 (criticizing Lockean “moral rights” 
rationale); McKenna, supra note 132, at 250–58 (same); cf. Post, supra note 127, at 658–62 (arguing 
that Warren and Brandeis began the evolution of justification away from a pure Lockean “labor” 
theory toward a broader “personality” theory). 
 139. See, e.g., Haemmerli, supra note 134, at 417–21 (arguing based on Kantian philosophy). 
 140. 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).  Another famous case of the era rejected a similar claim, see Roberson 
v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 447–48 (N.Y. 1902), but was overturned promptly by state 
legislation.  See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 1992). 
 141. Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 68–69 (“Under the plaintiff’s picture the following appeared: ‘In my 
healthy and productive period of life I bought insurance in the New England Mutual Life Insurance 
Co., of Boston, Mass., and to-day my family is protected and I am drawing an annual dividend on my 
paid-up policies.’ . . . He never made any such statement, and has not, and never has had, a policy of 
life insurance with the defendant company.”). 
 142. Id. at 80. 
 143. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576–77 (1977) (suggesting 
that the right of publicity protected incentives in a similar fashion to copyright and patent law); see 
also Dogan & Lemley, supra note 132, at 1186–90 (criticizing incentive rationale); McKenna, supra 
note 132, at 258–63 (same). 
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ty proves its value and therefore conclude that the person behind the 
persona should be compensated for its use.  As another early twentieth 
century court put it, “If there is value in [identity], sufficient to excite the 
cupidity of another, why is it not the property of him who gives it the 
value and from whom the value springs?”144  Either of these rationales 
might apply to social marketing, which piggybacks on the customer’s 
reputation among his or her friends to sell products.  Wresting control of 
the persona from an individual for commercial purposes might be seen as 
something akin to unjust enrichment.145 
Broadly speaking, these two types of arguments, rooted in natural 
rights or in economic efficiency, map on to two distinct, though overlap-
ping, claims for non-trademark persona rights: a tort claim of appropria-
tion that emphasizes protection of dignitary interests and a right of pub-
licity rooted in economic justifications.146 
It is not clear that mere appearance in a social marketing message 
necessarily unleashes this sort of metaphysical identity crisis.  Nor is it 
clear that recognizing this injury adds much to the law.  To the extent 
that unwanted exposure of the self causes injury, much would seem to be 
covered by the disclosure concern discussed above.  And a message that 
was unwanted to the point that its implication of endorsement becomes 
inaccurate falls within the information quality concern, also discussed 
above.  Nevertheless, some individuals prefer to separate themselves 
from the commercial realm, distinct from their desire to keep informa-
tion private or to prevent messages that distort their tastes.  As a descrip-
tive matter, the law certainly takes seriously the autonomy interests of 
individuals in controlling the commercial use of identity.  As we shall see, 
claims arising from these inchoate interests are among the strongest res-
ponses to all the concerns about social marketing. 
III. PARADIGMATIC LEGAL RESPONSES 
The types of concerns identified in Part II are hardly unique to so-
cial marketing.  The law already addresses the disclosure of personal da-
ta, the accuracy and quantity of marketplace information, and the inte-
grity of personal identity in many contexts. 
 
 144. Munden v. Harris, 134 S.W. 1076, 1078 (Mo. Ct. App. 1911); see also Roberson, 64 N.E. at 
450 (N.Y. 1902) (Gray, J., dissenting) (“[I]f her face or her portraiture has a value, the value is hers 
exclusively, until the use be granted away to the public.”). 
 145. See Caldwell, supra note 63, at 14 (“[Y]our shopping choices and preferences have value. 
Who owns those choices?  Common sense says that you do. If a company wants to use you to advertise 
its products, it can pay you, just as Nike pays Tiger Woods.”); Desai, supra note 120, manuscript at 22–
25; see also ANNE WELLS BRANSCOMB, WHO OWNS INFORMATION?: FROM PRIVACY TO PUBLIC 
ACCESS 174–86 (1994) (casting interest in control of personal information as ownership interest); Ann 
Bartow, Our Data, Ourselves: Privacy, Propertization, and Gender, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 633, 687–90 
(2000) (proposing property rights in personal data based on similar observations). 
 146. See infra Part III.C. 
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Social marketing presents a novel combination of these concerns, 
however.  The existing legal remedies evolved in response to particular 
harms; their boundaries blur and their internal limitations strain when 
they are tested by unforeseen technology and related business tech-
niques.  Legal decisionmakers facing potential problems created by 
changed technology should first try to adapt existing legal approaches to 
the new situation.  This Part reviews existing law and finds that, though 
each legal paradigm offers some insight into the ways law might handle 
social marketing, none responds to the full range of concerns about dis-
closure, endorsement, and identity. 
A. Privacy Law 
Just as the initial negative reaction to Facebook Ads centered on 
the disclosure of personal information and its privacy impact, the most 
natural and immediate legal response hinged on rules about handling 
personal information.147  Numerous privacy laws ban or restrict the dis-
semination of particular personal information.  These are a subset of in-
formation privacy law and are distinct from privacy laws with other pur-
poses (such as preventing trespass into personal space, eavesdropping, or 
spreading falsehoods).148  Because of its direct focus on disclosure of data, 
the laws in the “personal information” paradigm discussed here also dif-
fer from measures aimed more broadly at preserving the integrity of 
identity, discussed separately below.149  The type of privacy law consi-
dered in this Section simply regulates the handling of personal informa-
tion by those who are not the subject of that information.150 
The most significant problem with these limits on disclosure derives 
from their circumscribed scope.  Absent special considerations, there is 
no legal presumption of control over personal information (at least in the 
United States151).  Under the common law, if A tells B a secret, B does 
not have a legal duty to keep the secret unless B has a particular relation-
ship with A, or the information is so intimate or inherently private that it 
would be outrageous for B to divulge it.152  The third-party doctrine in 
 
 147. The legal actions taken against Facebook Ads—two class action suits in the United States 
and a regulatory complaint in Canada—were grounded in disclosure concerns and relied largely on 
privacy law claims.  See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text. 
 148. See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 525–52 (2006).  In this 
Article, I draw a sharper distinction than Solove does between legal rules about the disclosure of truth-
ful factual information and rules about misleading information, such as defamation or false light.  See 
id. at 545–52. 
 149. For discussion of the persona rights paradigm, see infra Part III.C. 
 150. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implica-
tions of a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1054–57 (2000) 
(drawing similar distinctions). 
 151. For more about the very different approach to disclosure of personal information in other 
countries, see infra notes 193–204 and accompanying text. 
 152. See Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of Con-
fidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 126, 151 (2007). 
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constitutional criminal procedure flows from the same reasoning; typical-
ly there is no “reasonable expectation of privacy” for information that a 
criminal defendant has conveyed to a third party, whether an institution 
like a bank or a personal friend.153  Constitutional and statutory law place 
a few additional restrictions on the collection and processing of informa-
tion by the government.154  Commercial vendors who glean personal in-
formation from customers’ shopping habits face even fewer legal con-
straints—indeed the multibillion-dollar database marketing industry 
depends on the constant exchange and accumulation of just such detailed 
personal information.155 
Across the board, then, the default assumption in American law is 
that personal information loses privacy protection as soon as one party 
confides it in another.156  Put another way, the law divides the world into 
public and private spheres, and usually removes restrictions on informa-
tion once it enters the public sphere.  Retailers and marketers, whether 
they exist in “bricks and mortar” facilities or online, fall on the public 
side of this dividing line.  The same reasoning could also be expressed in 
terms of waiver or consent: by confiding in another party, a person relin-
quishes legal entitlement to privacy of that information, absent special 
circumstances. 
Against this general background, social marketing appears unlikely 
to violate most U.S. privacy laws.  Users convey information to vendors 
through their browsing and shopping patterns, and the vendors typically 
enjoy freedom to dispose of that information however they like.  They 
may study it for general research purposes, use it to target or modify 
their sales pitches to that user or others that appear to have similar 
tastes, share it with other businesses directly or through data brokers—
and now, reveal it to users’ friends as part of a social marketing strategy. 
Of course, this general or default background does not represent 
the entirety of American privacy law.  Narrower rules aimed at particular 
problems depart from this default.  Most of these exceptions apply only 
to defined sets of highly sensitive disclosures, however.  None of them 
does much to address concerns about social marketing. 
The earliest expression of the personal information paradigm came 
through common law, principally the tort for public disclosure of private 
 
 153. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (bank); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 
745 (1971) (informant). 
 154. See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006) (limiting access to and use of personal 
data in government databases); Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) (upholding constitutionality of 
limits on state governments’ use of personal data collected by departments of motor vehicles); Whalen 
v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (recognizing possible constitutional basis for restricting government data 
collection). 
 155. See DAVID H. HOLTZMAN, PRIVACY LOST: HOW TECHNOLOGY IS ENDANGERING YOUR 
PRIVACY 187–209 (2006); ROBERT O’HARROW, JR., NO PLACE TO HIDE 34–73 (2005); DANIEL J. 
SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON 15–21 (2004). 
 156. See, e.g., Kang, supra note 93; Richards & Solove, supra note 152; Schwartz, supra note 96; 
Volokh, supra note 150. 
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facts.157  Setting the pattern for later law, however, its scope is limited to 
especially sensitive information.  In the words of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, liability under this theory attaches only “if the matter 
publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable 
person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.”158  This limita-
tion would immunize much of the ordinary information disclosed 
through social marketing, as the Restatement comments make clear: 
The rule stated in this Section gives protection only against unrea-
sonable publicity, of a kind highly offensive to the ordinary reason-
able man. . . . [The reasonable person] must expect the more or less 
casual observation of his neighbors as to what he does, and that his 
comings and goings and his ordinary daily activities, will be de-
scribed in the press as a matter of casual interest to others.  The or-
dinary reasonable man does not take offense at a report in a news-
paper that he has returned from a visit, gone camping in the woods 
or given a party at his house for his friends. . . . It is only when the 
publicity given to him is such that a reasonable person would feel 
justified in feeling seriously aggrieved by it, that the cause of action 
arises.159 
Most individual social marketing disclosures would fail the basic re-
quirements that they be “highly offensive,” “unreasonable,” or “seriously 
aggrieving.”  Among the four disclosure concerns discussed above, this 
tort responds best to fear of inherently sensitive disclosures, but that type 
of disclosure is the least likely to arise in social marketing.160  While the 
cumulative effect of frequent disclosures to friends about one’s ordinary 
shopping and browsing eventually might become intrusive, each disclo-
sure is judged on its own under this tort theory; no single revelation 
would be likely to strike a jury as “outrageous.”161  The focus of the dis-
closure tort on inherently sensitive information bypasses most social 
marketing. 
Even if it cleared this initial hurdle, a claim that social marketing vi-
olated this tort would face other challenges as well.  First Amendment 
and “newsworthiness” limitations have led to scholarly skepticism of 
whether the disclosure tort has any remaining vitality at all.162  In addi-
 
 157. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. 
L. REV. 383, 392–98 (1960). 
 158. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D. 
 159. Id. § 652D cmt. c. 
 160. See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text.  It might be possible to reconceptualize the 
disclosure tort to better reflect the dynamics of social networks.  See Grimmelmann, supra note 36, 
manuscript at 44–45.  See generally Strahilevitz, supra note 103.  This would represent a dramatic de-
parture, however, so for current purposes I put this intriguing possibility aside. 
 161. See Richards & Solove, supra note 152, at 175. 
 162. See, e.g., Rodney A. Smolla, Privacy and the First Amendment Right to Gather News, 67 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1097, 1101 (1999) (arguing that the tort exists “more ‘in the books’ than in practice”); 
Volokh, supra note 150, at 1122–24 (summing up “significant doctrinal problems” with the tort); Diane 
L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 
CORNELL L. REV. 291, 293, 362–65 (1983) (summing up argument that the tort is a “failure”). 
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tion, some courts view the tort as a prohibition only on unlimited publi-
cation, such as in a newspaper, and thus might conclude that a message 
sent to a defined network of friends does not qualify as “publicity.”163 
More recently, statutes have added special privacy rules to the un-
derlying lack of duty in U.S. law, but these also confine themselves to 
particular situations.  “Sectoral” federal statutes focus narrowly on the 
handling of certain kinds of data, and often they apply only to certain 
types of actors.164  For example, the Federal Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) issued complex privacy rules under the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) that apply only 
to treatment of “individually identifiable health information”165 by cer-
tain “covered entities” within the health care and insurance industries.166  
The law has no direct effect on mishandling of health information by 
people or entities outside the purview of the HHS or on collection of 
medical information unrelated to delivery of and payment for health 
care.167  Similarly, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act deals only with personal 
financial information.168  The Fair Credit Reporting Act generally regu-
lates only personal information used to help determine a consumer’s eli-
gibility for credit or employment.169 
Most social marketing would be unlikely to fall within the specific 
situations covered by sectoral laws.  Again, as with the public disclosure 
tort, these statutory protections single out areas of especially intimate 
personal information.170  Social marketers typically know better than to 
alienate customers by disclosing their physical, financial, sexual, or politi-
cal affairs. 
 
 163. See Robert C. Ozer, P.C. v. Borquez, 940 P.2d 371, 378 (Colo. 1997) (requiring disclosure to 
“the general public or to a large number of persons”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D 
cmt. a (1977) (stating that the “publicity” element requires communication “to the public at large, or to 
so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public 
knowledge”).  The decisions on this requirement are a mixed bag.  Compare Bauer v. Ford Motor 
Credit Co., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1023–24 (D. Minn. 2001) (disclosure to four friends and employer did 
not constitute publicity), and Shattuck-Owen v. Snowbird Corp., 16 P.3d 555, 559 (Utah 2000) (disclo-
sure to ten people involved in sexual assault investigation did not constitute publicity), with McSurely 
v. McClellan, 753 F.2d 88, 112–13 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (upholding jury verdict under Kentucky law finding 
liability for disclosure to U.S. Senate investigator), Miller v. Motorola, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 900, 902–03 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (disclosure to fellow employees did constitute publicity), and Beaumont v. Brown, 
257 N.W.2d 522, 531 (Mich. 1977) (allowing liability for disclosure to “a particular public, whose know-
ledge of the private facts would be embarrassing to the plaintiff”). 
 164. See Reidenberg, supra note 84, at 507–09; see also SOLOVE, supra note 155, at 67–72 (describ-
ing different sectoral statutes). 
 165. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2007). 
 166. Id. § 160.102. 
 167. See Scope of Criminal Enforcement Under 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6, Op. Off. Legal Counsel 
(June 1, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/hipaa_final.htm. 
 168. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809 (2006); see Edward J. Janger & Paul M. 
Schwartz, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Information Privacy, and the Limits of Default Rules, 86 
MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1224–30 (2002). 
 169. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b). 
 170. See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text. 
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Furthermore, the entities that might engage in social marketing of-
ten are not the ones covered by the statutes.  For example, numerous 
health-related web sites, including those run by pharmaceutical compa-
nies and many sites with peer support groups, have no connection to 
“covered entities” under the HIPAA regulations.171  One can imagine 
that such sites might try social marketing techniques to promote their 
services and attract new users.172  If they did so, even in a manner that ex-
posed sensitive personal health information, HIPAA would have no im-
pact.  These sorts of commercial consumer-oriented sites are more likely 
than covered entities such as doctors and insurers to try social marketing 
in the first place. 
There is at least one notable exception where a topic of social mar-
keting messages was also covered by one of the sectoral U.S. privacy stat-
utes.  The two U.S. lawsuits filed in response to Facebook Ads both rely 
(in whole or in part) on a relatively obscure and narrow statute of this 
kind, the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA).173  Congress passed the 
law in direct response to an article in an alternative weekly newspaper 
disclosing the video rental history of Judge Robert Bork’s family during 
his contentious Supreme Court confirmation hearings.174  The VPPA im-
poses liability for any “video tape service provider who knowingly dis-
closes, to any person, personally identifiable information concerning any 
consumer of such provider.”175  Unlike most sectoral laws, the VPPA pro-
tects intellectual privacy rather than inherently sensitive topics such as 
health or finances.  It also intersects with a type of content (movie choic-
es) much better suited to social marketing (indeed, the very example  
Facebook used when launching Beacon). 
Both lawsuits claim that, at least under the original form of the Bea-
con program, some film-oriented sites sent social marketing messages to 
the Facebook friends of users noting when they rented movies or re-
served them in a rental queue.176  On its face, this charge appears to be 
valid.177  The early structure of Beacon probably did not satisfy the 
VPPA’s requirement for “informed, written consent of the consumer 
 
 171. See ANGELA CHOY ET AL., EXPOSED ONLINE: WHY THE NEW FEDERAL HEALTH PRIVACY 
REGULATION DOESN’T OFFER MUCH PROTECTION TO INTERNET USERS 16–21 (November 2001), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2001/PIP_HIPP_HealthPriv_report.pdf.pdf. 
 172. See Stephanie Clifford, Online Age Quiz Is a Window for Drug Makers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 
2009, at A1 (describing how sponsors of the online health quiz RealAge sell the information collected 
about millions of users to pharmaceutical companies to enable targeted marketing). 
 173. 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2006). 
 174. See 134 CONG. REC. 31,839–40 (1988); SOLOVE, supra note 155, at 69. 
 175. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1).  The VPPA provides a private right of action and a statutory damag-
es minimum of $2500.  Id. § 2710(c). 
 176. Lane Complaint, supra note 7, at 42–49, (naming the sites Blockbuster.com, Fandango.com, 
Overstock.com, and Gamefly.com, and also suing Facebook for allegedly aiding and abetting those 
violations); Harris Complaint, supra note 81, at 1, (suing Blockbuster only). 
 177. See Posting of James Grimmelmann to The Laboratorium, Facebook and the VPPA: Uh-Oh, 
http://www.laboratorium.net/archive/2007/12/10/facebook_and_the_vppa_uhoh (Dec. 10, 2007, 1:14). 
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given at the time the disclosure is sought.”178  Nor did it fit the statute’s 
exemption for direct marketing.179  In contrast, the revised Beacon pro-
gram probably satisfies the VPPA because users themselves opt to dis-
close information about their movie choices.180 
These VPPA claims serve as exceptions that prove the rule, howev-
er.  In general, it is unlikely that social marketing would disclose the spe-
cial types of information regulated by the alphabet soup of federal stat-
utes.  True, litigation has arisen about online tracking and data mining 
related to sensitive topics such as health, so it is not out of the question 
that a purveyor of such products might turn to some form of social mar-
keting in the future.181  Normally, however, social marketing messages are 
built around the quotidian purchasing and internet surfing of one’s 
friends.  Specialized statutes rarely extend to this kind of information.  
Only a historical accident led Congress to regulate video rentals.  No 
comparable federal statute forbids disclosures that compromise intellec-
tual privacy in other ways, for example records of individual book pur-
chases,182 magazine subscriptions,183 or general web surfing.184  Richards 
argues that social norms and the culture of institutions like libraries and 
universities might have made such laws unnecessary in the past, but in-
novations such as social marketing could call this premise into question 
in the future.185 
 
 178. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(B). 
 179. This exception allows disclosure of customers’ names, addresses, and general genres of mov-
ie preferences provided that customers can opt out of such information sharing and “the disclosure 
does not identify the title, description, or subject matter of any video tapes or other audio visual ma-
terial; however, the subject matter of such materials may be disclosed if the disclosure is for the exclu-
sive use of marketing goods and services directly to the consumer.”  Id. § 2710(b)(2)(D).  Thus, the 
VPPA does allow the most common form of direct behavioral targeting, through gathering dossier 
information to support advertising aimed at the subject of the data.  Nonconsensual social marketing, 
however, reveals actual titles and does so in order to market goods and service not directly to consum-
ers but to their friends.  It falls outside this exemption.  For more general discussion of the differences 
between behavioral targeting and social marketing, see infra notes 272–76 and accompanying text. 
 180. The Lane suit is confined to the period before Beacon’s alteration.  See Lane Complaint, 
supra note 7, at 3.  The Harris suit, in contrast, alleges that Blockbuster continued to violate the VPPA 
even after the reform of Beacon, because although user permission was then required before sending 
messages to friends, the site allegedly provided Facebook with protected information.  See Harris 
Complaint, supra note 81.  Based on an analysis of the code supporting Beacon, this does not appear 
to be the case; at most, Blockbuster’s servers checked with Facebook’s servers to connect a user to a 
Facebook account and ask permission to send a social marketing message, but do not appear to trans-
mit any information protected by the VPPA at that stage.  See Posting of Jay Goldman to Radiant 
Core, supra note 61.  Again, my thanks to Jesse Cheng for his technical assistance. 
 181. See, e.g., In re Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d 9, 15–16 (1st Cir. 2003); cf. Clifford, supra note 172. 
 182. But see Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044, 1054 (Colo. 2002) (finding 
limited privacy protection for book purchases in state constitution).  Most states do have some form of 
privacy statute covering library borrowing records, although their terms vary widely.  See Am. Library 
Ass’n, State Privacy Laws Regarding Library Records, http://www.ala.org/ala/aboutala/offices/oif/ 
ifgroups/stateifcchairs/stateifcinaction/stateprivacy.cfm (last visited May 26, 2009). 
 183. See Shibley v. Time, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975) (dismissing suit against maga-
zine publisher for selling subscriber lists to direct marketers). 
 184. See Kang, supra note 93, at 1227, 1230–32.  But see infra note 272 and accompanying text (de-
scribing modest FTC rulemaking concerning the regulation of behavioral advertising). 
 185. Richards, supra note 86, at 419–21. 
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One of the Beacon lawsuits also adds claims based on the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA).186  This statute is related only 
loosely to disclosure—although the ECPA does prohibit further dissemi-
nation of information that is gathered through improper methods,187 most 
of the statute regulates the manner of collecting information.188  This 
ECPA claim against social marketing appears weak in any event.  Con-
sistent with the default position of American law, the ECPA permits one 
party to a communication to disclose its contents without the other par-
ty’s consent—and here, one of those two parties is the marketing web 
site.189 
In sum, U.S. law concerning disclosure of personal information of-
fers almost no response to the possible dangers of social marketing.  It 
concentrates on privacy in inherently sensitive matters, but these topics 
are unlikely to become the subject of social marketing.  These laws pro-
tect intellectual privacy only in rare instances, such as the VPPA.  They 
offer no general response at all to uneasiness about decontextualized dis-
closures or general surveillance. 
Aside from its poor treatment of disclosure concerns, this paradigm 
offers even less of a response to the other concerns outlined in Part II.  
Information quality concerns such as misleading implied endorsements 
or spamification do not derive from the personal nature of the informa-
tion at all.  Likewise, a social marketing message can compromise an in-
dividual’s control over his or her identity without disclosing any sensitive 
personal information.  As we have seen, although disclosure is the most 
evident problem with bad social marketing practices, it is not the only 
one. 
Finally, the personal information paradigm presents significant 
structural and doctrinal problems in the United States.  The emotional or 
psychic harms caused by disclosures in social marketing are difficult to 
quantify and, in any case, are likely small.  Injured parties who file law-
suits to enforce their rights under privacy law often encounter great diffi-
culty proving damages.190  Only a few privacy laws offer statutory damag-
 
 186. See Lane Complaint, supra note 7, at 40–42 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2006)). 
 187. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c); see Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 520–21 (2001). 
 188. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a)–(b); see also supra note 148 and accompanying text.  In his at-
tempt to develop a new taxonomy of information privacy law, for instance, Daniel Solove classifies 
“surveillance” and “intrusion” separately from a cluster of privacy interests related to “information 
dissemination.”  Solove, supra note 148, at 478, 491–99, 552–57. 
 189. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d); Chance v. Avenue A, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1162 (W.D. 
Wash. 2001).  Twelve states do require consent of all parties under their state versions of the ECPA.  
See The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Can We Tape?: A Practical Guide to Taping 
Phone Calls and In-Person Conversations in the 50 States and D.C. http://www.rcfp.org/taping/ 
index.html (last visited May 26, 2009) (listing California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Mas-
sachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Washington). 
 190. See, e.g., Forbes v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 420 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1020–21 (D. Minn. 2006) 
(rejecting breach of contract and negligence claims arising from theft of plaintiff’s personal data be-
cause fear of possible identity theft was too speculative); In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig. 
379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 326–27 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (rejecting breach of contract claim for violation of priva-
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es or other such automatic compensation for injuries.191  Without the 
prospect of significant damages, private attorneys have no incentive to 
bring such cases.  Furthermore, in many social marketing situations class 
actions would also present certification problems because of possible fac-
tual differences in the understanding and attitudes of different class 
members.192 
Many of these problems are particular to the United States.  
Though the default position of U.S. privacy law generally excludes social 
marketing, most other industrialized countries generally observe the op-
posite default.  “Data protection” statutes and regulations in these na-
tions start from the assumption that companies cannot collect or use per-
sonal data.193  The pathbreaking European Union directive on data 
protection requires that automatically processed personal information 
not be disclosed without consent unless one of several particular excep-
tions applies.194  All processing and use of personal data within the EU 
must be compatible with the directive’s transparency, legitimacy, and 
proportionality standards.  Similar regimes now have been enacted in 
other countries, including Canada and Japan.195  A social marketing pro-
gram along the lines of the reformed Beacon as depicted in Figure 1 
might satisfy these requirements.  A program similar to the original form 
of Beacon as depicted in Figure 2 could be unlawful in countries adher-
ing to data protection regimes like the EU directive.  Though these dif-
ferent regimes would not apply to Americans, they could prevent social 
marketing messages about citizens of the countries that adopt them. 
The transnational nature of online information creates loopholes in 
these more protective regimes, however.  In principle, personal data col-
lected within the EU may only be processed outside the EU if the other 
country “ensure[s] that the rights and obligations” with respect to per-
sonal data “are respected.”196  Although baseline U.S. law does not satisfy 
this standard, the relevant governments have negotiated a “safe harbor” 
agreement to allow transfers of personal information from the EU.  Un-
der the safe harbor, U.S. companies may certify their acceptance of a set 
of privacy principles that is significantly weaker than the EU’s require-
 
cy policy because of failure to prove damages); Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1356–57 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (rejecting claim under Illinois Consumer Fraud Act about disclosure of credit his-
tory for failure to prove damages). 
 191. The VPPA is one such exception.  18 U.S.C. § 2710(c)(2) (providing for liquidated damages 
of $2,500, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees). 
 192. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). 
 193. See Joel R. Reidenberg, E-Commerce and Trans-Atlantic Privacy, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 717, 
731–33 (2001). 
 194. Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 34, 38–39 [hereinafter 
EU Directive]. 
 195. See Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, R.S.C., ch. P-8.6 (2000) 
(Can.); Act on the Protection of Personal Information, Law No. 57 of 2003 (Japan). 
 196. EU Directive, supra note 194, at art. 20. 
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ments, although somewhat stronger than the American default posi-
tion.197  These self-certifying companies are then immunized from liability 
under EU law; such enforcement as exists is handled entirely through 
United States institutions, chiefly the Department of Commerce.198  Face-
book has self-certified its adherence to the safe harbor requirements.199  
Although MySpace has not done so,200 the site’s privacy policy disclaims 
all liability under the EU Directive.201 
Canadian privacy law takes a more aggressive stand on its applica-
bility to companies in other countries that process data about Canadians.  
A recent court decision found that Canada’s federal privacy commission-
er must investigate complaints in such situations.202  Last year a group of 
students in an internet law clinic at the University of Ottawa filed a for-
mal regulatory complaint arguing that a wide variety of Facebook’s prac-
tices, including Facebook Ads, violated Canadian data protection law.203  
As required by law, the commissioner is now investigating Facebook in 
response.204 
Whatever its potential in other countries, legal restrictions on dis-
closure of personal information in the United States would have little ef-
fect on social marketing practices.  Privacy law here addresses disclosure 
only in certain narrow and unlikely situations and does nothing about 
other concerns.  Even though these laws have been the first and most 
natural response to social marketing, they are oriented toward quite dif-
ferent situations. 
 
 197. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Safe Harbor Privacy Principles (July 21, 2000), http://www.export. 
gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018475.asp; see Reidenberg, supra note 193, at 744–46 (noting that the 
Safe Harbor requirements are weaker than European privacy law but stronger than U.S. privacy law). 
 198. See Reidenberg, supra note 193, at 745; U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Safe Harbor Overview, 
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/SH_Overview.asp (last visited May 26, 2009). 
 199. See Facebook, Facebook Principles EU Safe Harbor Participation (Nov. 26, 2008), 
http://www.facebook.com/policy.php. 
 200. See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Safe Harbor List, http://web.ita.doc.gov/safeharbor/SHList.nsf 
(last visited May 26, 2009). 
 201. MySpace, Privacy Policy (Feb. 28, 2008), http://www.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction= 
misc.privacy (“When a Member who is located in the European Union chooses to post Profile Infor-
mation that will be publicly disclosed, that Member is responsible for ensuring that such information 
conforms to all local data protection laws.  MySpace is not responsible under the EU local data protec-
tion laws for Member-posted information.”). 
 202. Lawson v. Accusearch Inc., [2007] F.C.R. 314 (Can.). 
 203. Lawson Complaint, supra note 82.  The complaint alleges that Facebook provides too little 
notice about the disclosure of information through its social marketing programs and that the manner 
in which it secures consent for disclosures is inadequate.  Id. at 14–17.  Facebook’s chief privacy officer 
replied in a statement that the complaint misinterpreted Canadian data protection law and contained 
“serious factual errors—most notably its neglect of the fact that almost all Facebook data is willingly 
shared by users.”  Tamsyn Burgmann, Federal Privacy Commissioner Launches Facebook Probe, 
GLOBE & MAIL, May 30, 2008, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20080530. 
wgtfacebookprobe0530/BNStory/Technology/. 
 204. See Burgmann, supra note 203. 
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B. Trademark and Unfair Competition Law 
A second legal paradigm focuses not on the personal nature of in-
formation contained in a social marketing message, but on the accuracy 
of its implied customer endorsement.  As discussed in Part II.B, an en-
dorsement must be both accurate and voluntary to avoid distorting the 
customer’s connection with and opinion of the product.  Advertising that 
leaves a misleading or confusing impression of endorsement or affiliation 
is subject to liability under the law of trademarks and unfair competition.  
If we analogize personal identity to a trademark, aspects of trademark 
law match concerns about misleading social marketing endorsements 
very well. 
Federal trademark law forbids uses of a trademark that falsely sug-
gest “affiliation, connection, or association” between the trademark 
holder and another party, or falsely suggest the trademark holder’s 
“sponsorship” or “approval” of the other party.205  This allegation tradi-
tionally arises in a wide variety of familiar situations: for example, stores 
or repair shops display the trademarks of the products they sell or fix,206 
manufacturers of finished products show the trademarks of ingredients 
or component parts,207 and events or groups show the marks of their 
sponsors, “official” or otherwise.208  In addition, individual celebrities 
have established trademark rights in their own images and exercise those 
rights to prevent uses that mislead consumers into thinking the celebrity 
endorses a product.209  Bad social marketing practices similarly risk pre-
senting a misleading impression of an endorsement that does not exist. 
More generally, trademark law concerns itself with messages that 
associate two different identities in the mind of a recipient, similar to the 
reputational piggybacking effect of social marketing.  A trademarked 
brand has an identity just as surely as does an individual.210  The reputa-
tion of this identity influences consumer purchasing decisions.  Mean-
while, marketers zealously use their power over endorsements and asso-
ciations to protect the integrity of trademarked brands and to ensure that 
those brands do not become overexposed or associated with qualities 
 
 205. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
 206. See, e.g., Scott Fetzer Co. v. House of Vacuums Inc., 381 F.3d 477, 489–90 (5th Cir. 2004); 
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 411 F.2d 350, 351 (9th Cir. 1969). 
 207. See, e.g., Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359 (1924); Bumble Bee Seafoods, L.L.C. v. UFS 
Indus., Inc., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1684 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2004). 
 208. See, e.g., Fed’n Internationale de Football Ass’n v. Nike, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 2d 64 (D.D.C. 
2003); cf. MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co. v. Pink Panther Patrol, 774 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (find-
ing that the name “Pink Panther Patrol” of a gay rights organization infringed on the Pink Panther 
trademark by suggesting sponsorship of the movie character). 
 209. See, e.g., Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp. 826, 833–36 (S.D.N.Y. 
1990); see also infra Part III.C (discussing publicity rights and other “persona rights”). 
 210. Consumers need not understand the ownership of a company or the exact provenance of a 
product if they recognize the brand identity.  See Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & 
Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1955); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9, cmt. c (1995). 
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that undermine their carefully crafted image.  A regime like trademark 
law thus could avoid distortion of consumer choices through misleading 
social marketing messages and also prevent squandering the power of in-
dividuals’ identities through overuse—some of the very same informa-
tion quality concerns raised by poorly designed social marketing. 
There are several problems with exporting this trademark model di-
rectly to social marketing, however.  For historical reasons, trademark 
law extends only to identities of brands (or, increasingly, of celebrities) 
that already have been exploited commercially.  Furthermore, trademark 
law imposes conditions that might not translate well to the social market-
ing context, especially its focus only on provably misleading or confusing 
associations.  Finally, the economic focus of trademark rules ignores oth-
er concerns discussed in Part II, particularly the disclosure of personal 
information. 
A threshold problem with applying a trademark model to social 
marketing is the traditional commercially rooted definition of a trade-
mark.  Beginning with its common law origins in unfair competition law, 
trademark protection has attached when a vendor first used the trade-
mark to sell products.211  In the alternative, the Lanham Act now allows 
optional federal registration of trademarks, but that protection also 
lapses absent commercial use of the mark.212  Either way, trademarks ex-
ist precisely because consumers already perceive them as signifiers of 
some commercial meaning.213  This definition emerged in part because a 
standard rationale for trademark rights relies principally on its protection 
of consumers rather than the trademark holder.214  Brand names, logos, 
distinctive packaging, slogans, and product features allow would-be pur-
chasers to locate the items they seek consistently and efficiently.215 
 
 211. See, e.g., In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (“At common law the exclusive right 
to [a trademark] grows out of its use, and not its mere adoption.”); Sengoku Works Ltd. v. RMC Int’l, 
Ltd., 96 F.3d 1217, 1219 (9th Cir. 1996) (“It is axiomatic in trademark law that the standard test of 
ownership is priority of use.  To acquire ownership of a trademark it is not enough to have invented 
the mark first or even to have registered it first; the party claiming ownership must have been the first 
to actually use the mark in the sale of goods or services.”). 
 212. See 15 U.S.C. § 1119 (2006) (allowing courts to cancel registration of trademarks that are 
abandoned or otherwise lack the requirements for protection); id. § 1127 (defining “abandonment”). 
 213. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13 (defining the distinctiveness re-
quirement for trademark protection). 
 214. But see Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1839, 1849–73 (2007) (arguing that goals of producer protection were woven into trademark 
law from its inception). 
 215. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995); Robert G. Bone, En-
forcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099, 2104–08 (2004); William M. Landes & 
Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 268–70 (1987); 
William McGeveran, Four Free Speech Goals for Trademark Law, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1205, 1207–12 (2008).  Secondarily, trademark rights also preserve incentives for 
producers to maintain the quality of their product, since they, not some imposter, will reap the rewards 
of repeat patronage when buyers like their products.  Even this is usually explained as a benefit for 
consumers rather than producers because it rewards investment in high-quality goods.  See Qualitex, 
514 U.S. at 164. 
MCGEVERAN.DOC 7/24/2009  12:01 PM 
1146 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2009 
Although the dawning era of social marketing shows that endorse-
ments from ordinary individuals have (some) value, only a famous per-
son can leverage personal identity into a recognized marketplace iden-
tifier.  This requirement of widespread public identification of a mark is 
more than a mere condition that could be dispensed with in social mar-
keting contexts; it represents the fundamental character of a trademark.  
The law exists to protect that preexisting public and commercial under-
standing.  Conversely, privacy and certain persona rights insulate indi-
vidual identity from commercial exploitation.  The raison d’etre of 
trademark law is the evil to be avoided by privacy and persona rights law. 
Even individuals’ names merit protection under standard trademark 
doctrine with proof of secondary meaning—that is, an existing associa-
tion in the public mind between the name and the sale of particular 
products or services.216  Modern trademark law largely repudiates the 
nineteenth century rule that gave second-comers the right to use their 
own name in business; rather, such use infringes if the use causes confu-
sion to consumers.217  Thus, a person named McDonald probably cannot 
open an eponymous restaurant.  Overall, trademark law protects only 
identities already familiar to the public—brands and celebrities—but sel-
dom ordinary private individuals. 
The analogy to trademarks also breaks down because trademark 
law requires proof that consumers are likely to be confused by an alleg-
edly misleading or false endorsement.  The test for judging the likeli-
hood of confusion, and precedents applying that test, have grown up in a 
particular factual setting different from that of social marketing.  The 
doctrine already presents some awkward interpretive difficulties when 
transported from the context of merchandise to celebrities.  These prob-
lems would only intensify if applied to ordinary customers as if their 
identities were trademarks.  For example, instead of the public at large, 
the potentially confused segment of the population is composed entirely 
of friends of the aggrieved party.  Litigants in false endorsement cases of-
ten proffer survey evidence demonstrating that consumers did (or did 
not) understand the use of the trademark in question to convey affilia-
tion or sponsorship, but competent evidence of that sort would be diffi-
cult to gather in a social networking scenario.  Similarly, standard factors 
for judging confusion, such as “relatedness of the goods” or “marketing 
channels used,” become nearly useless in social marketing situations.  
Again, the different factual background of social marketing presents new 
challenges.  The lack of any history of commercial exploitation of an or-
dinary customer’s identity makes trademark law inapposite. 
 
 216. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 14.  The rule quite sensibly seeks to 
protect “the opportunity for similarly-named persons to exploit their name in business.”  Id. § 14 
cmt. e. 
 217. See 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 13:8 (4th ed. 2008). 
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Another complication arises from the murky doctrine of fair use in 
trademark law.218  When a mark is used merely to identify a product or its 
maker, that use often should be found noninfringing to avoid unduly 
constraining communication.  A true statement of fact about a person in 
social marketing—such as “Joe ate at the restaurant” or “Joe took the 
quiz”—thus presents a difficult issue.  Cases involving truthful statements 
about celebrity identities split on this question, often depending on par-
ticular facts.219  Social marketing would almost always present just such 
tricky cases. 
As a final example of the poor fit between trademark law and social 
marketing, the form of relief in trademark cases adapts poorly to social 
marketing.  Most trademark holders who litigate seek injunctive relief as 
their primary goal, because they believe continuing infringement causes 
concrete, ongoing harm to their business.  Courts are often wary of 
awarding damages in garden-variety infringement cases.220  As we saw 
with privacy law, a typical individual whose identity has been used in a 
social marketing message would find it very difficult to prove damages in 
an isolated case.221  Attorney fee awards are rare and limited to “excep-
tional” cases.222  Thus, even if the many other difficulties were eliminated, 
lawyers would have no incentive to pursue trademark-based social mar-
keting cases.  Trademark law, because it protects only marks used for 
business purposes, understandably protects only those motivated by 
business-related damages.  This structure works tolerably well for its in-
tended beneficiaries but would not do a good job if repurposed for social 
marketing. 
Claims for unfair competition or false advertising could avoid 
some—but not all—of these pitfalls of trademark law.  A claim under 
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act or equivalent state laws is more flexible 
than a trademark claim because it only needs to demonstrate some mis-
representation in commercial advertising or promotion.223  Professor El-
len Goodman recently conducted a comprehensive review of the applica-
tion of false advertising law to new peer-to-peer marketing techniques.224  
Goodman persuasively argued that promotional messages that draw on 
user-generated elements remain fully subject to false advertising law if a 
 
 218. Elsewhere I have criticized this doctrine and suggested improvements.  See William McGe-
veran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49, 51–54 (2008). 
 219. Compare, e.g., Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1154–55 (9th Cir. 2002), with Ab-
dul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 412–13 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 220. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 217, § 30:58 (“Monetary liability in trademark cases without 
fault or knowingly performing illegal acts seems to give most judges considerable pause.  However, 
evidence of actual confusion of some customers or evidence of actual losses suffered by plaintiff will 
often supply the missing element even where defendant ignorantly blundered into an infringing act.  
Such actual confusion or damage is notoriously difficult to prove, let alone quantify.”) 
 221. See supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
 222. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2006). 
 223. See id. § 1125(a)(1)(B). 
 224. Ellen P. Goodman, Peer Promotions and False Advertising Law, 58 S.C. L. REV. 683 (2007). 
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marketer adopts or disseminates them.225  Even though she did not dis-
cuss social marketing (further testament to how quickly these advertising 
trends are developing), Goodman’s analysis clearly applies to the tech-
nique.  Social marketing involves a promotional message that is created 
and transmitted by the advertiser, who takes legal responsibility for its 
truthfulness. 
Again, however, the factual context of false advertising law differs 
so much from social marketing that problems arise.  First, a person fea-
tured in a social marketing message may lack standing to challenge it un-
der false advertising law.  In general, courts do not allow consumers to 
sue for false advertising under Section 43(a) because their injury is not 
the commercial type for which the Lanham Act was intended.226  Unlike 
consumers, celebrities who allege that advertising has falsely implied 
their endorsement often have standing to sue—but usually courts reach 
this conclusion based on celebrities’ long-standing and significant busi-
ness interest in marketing their image.227  While not free from doubt, it 
seems likely that an ordinary person whose identity has been used in a 
misleading way for social marketing would resemble a consumer more 
than a celebrity who suffers commercial harms.228  Second, the nature of 
falsehood required for liability would present difficulties.  Social market-
ing messages transmit truthful information but may invite a false infe-
rence of endorsement.  Such misleading implications, as opposed to di-
rectly false statements, are much more difficult to prove.229  Third and 
perhaps most significant, even if standing and proof problems could be 
overcome, a would-be plaintiff in a false advertising case still faces the 
same familiar problem with the inefficiency of individual suits that we 
have already seen in privacy and trademark law.  The design of unfair 
competition and false advertising law offers the most effective redress to 
commercial competitors, not to ordinary individuals featured in promo-
tional messages. 
Finally, even at its most effective, trademark and unfair competition 
law both address only the information quality issues outlined in Part II.B.  
 
 225. Id. at 703.  In contrast, Goodman concluded that a “pure peer” promotion without any in-
volvement by the brand owner is noncommercial speech and unregulated by false advertising law.  Id. 
at 700. 
 226. See generally Richard A. De Sevo, Consumer Standing Under Section 43(a): An Issue Whose 
Time Has Passed, 88 TRADEMARK REP. 1 (1998) (reviewing and analyzing court decisions on consum-
er standing under the Lanham Act). 
 227. See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1107–10 (9th Cir. 1992) (concluding after 
lengthy analysis that the singer’s “standing was sufficiently established by the likelihood that the 
wrongful use of his professional trademark, his unique voice, would injure him commercially”); Allen 
v. Nat’l Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 625–26 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (making a comparison to trademarks 
and finding that “[a] celebrity has a similar commercial investment in the ‘drawing power’ of his or her 
name and face in endorsing products and in marketing a career”). 
 228. See Kournikova v. Gen. Media Comms. Inc., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1614, 1619 (C.D. Cal. 
2002). 
 229. See generally Rebecca Tushnet, It Depends on What the Meaning of “False” Is: Falsity and 
Misleadingness in Commercial Speech Doctrine, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 227 (2007). 
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Trademark-like rights may prevent misleading implications of endorse-
ment.  Indirectly, they also could avoid overexposure of individual en-
dorsers.  But disclosure concerns discussed in Part II.A would remain un-
resolved.  Likewise, although trademark rights do allow firms to exercise 
a fair amount of control over the identities of their brands, at least in 
principle the law confers that control for instrumental purposes, as a 
means to respond to information quality concerns, rather than for the 
distinct dignitary reasons identified in Part II.C. 
Overall, it is tempting to see the well-developed body of law sur-
rounding trademarks and false advertising as an ideal way to tackle in-
formation quality problems presented by social marketing.  The highly 
developed state of that law actually creates problems, however, because 
it is tailored for other situations and matches poorly with many aspects of 
social marketing. 
C. “Persona Rights” Law 
The next area of law to consider blends aspects of the previous two 
to create a hybrid of privacy and intellectual property law. I will call this 
overall approach the “persona rights” paradigm.230  As noted above,231 
identity control concerns are grounded in two understandings of the in-
terests at stake, one focused more on offense to dignitary interests and 
the other on a right to compensation for commercial value.  These inter-
pretations have led to two related but distinct legal claims: the tort of ap-
propriation and the right of publicity, respectively. 
As Robert Post mildly states, “The process of distinguishing publici-
ty from privacy rights was protracted and confused. . . .232  Judges and 
scholars have puzzled at length over the contours of the two claims and 
their relationship to one another.  On the whole, social marketing avoids 
these more familiar controversies about persona rights, but instead en-
counters new problems with the paradigm.  There is some dispute about 
the nature of the interest protected by each doctrine, but social market-
ing straddles the divide between them.  Earlier cases, following in the 
footsteps of Warren and Brandeis, saw nonconsensual uses of persona as 
infringements on individuals’ dignitary interests.233  William Prosser even-
tually crystallized a tort of appropriation from these cases.234  As reporter 
for the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Prosser then enshrined his defini-
 
 230. See Haemmerli, supra note 134, at 479–80 (“The term ‘persona’ has long been used to de-
scribe the facet of personality that is presented to the outside world.  It is a useful and desirable term 
because it evokes human personality and, in turn, human freedom.”). 
 231. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 232. Post, supra note 127, at 667. 
 233. Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905); see 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 132, 
§ 1.18 (“Most of the courts accepting the Pavesich view emphasized that the right was personal and not 
proprietary.”). 
 234. Prosser, supra note 157, at 401–07. 
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tion of this tort as occurring when someone “appropriates to his own use 
or benefit the name and likeness of another.”235  Several states also have 
statutes that create equivalent liability.236  Prosser himself emphasized the 
unauthorized taking of property instead of the affront to dignity.237  In 
general, however, courts applying the Restatement’s appropriation 
framework still tend to look for dignitary harms.238  Courts usually do not 
require plaintiffs in such cases to show that their identity had any com-
mercial value.239 
Meanwhile, explicit rights of publicity emerged in the middle of the 
twentieth century to cover monetary harms that might arise from com-
mercial use of identity, generally of celebrities.  In a 1954 law review ar-
ticle justifying and fleshing out the proposed new right, the respected in-
tellectual property scholar Melville Nimmer argued that the dignity-
based rationale was “not adequate to meet the demands of the second 
half of the twentieth century, particularly with respect to the advertising, 
motion picture, television, and radio industries.”240  Judge Jerome Frank 
had opined a year earlier, in a groundbreaking decision among the first 
to recognize a publicity rights claim explicitly, that “prominent persons 
(especially actors and ball-players), far from having their feelings bruised 
through public exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if 
they no longer received money for authorizing advertisements.”241 
While this difference between dignity and monetary harm drives 
much of the discussion about persona rights, and might prove significant 
in many cases, it would have little effect on a claim of injury from social 
marketing.  Publicity rights were developed with celebrities in mind, but 
ordinary persons usually can recover if the use of their image deprived 
them of financial benefits.242  Likewise, famous people sometimes can 
 
 235. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977). 
 236. See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 1992); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344–3344.6 
(West 1997). 
 237. See Prosser, supra note 157, at 406–07 (“The interest protected is not so much a mental as a 
proprietary one, in the exclusive use of the plaintiff’s name and likeness as an aspect of his identity.”). 
 238. See, e.g., Jim Henson Prods., Inc. v. John T. Brady & Assocs., 867 F. Supp. 175, 188–89 
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“The privacy-based action is designed for individuals who have not placed them-
selves in the public eye.  It shields such people from the embarrassment of having their faces plastered 
on billboards and cereal boxes without their permission.  The interests protected are dignity and peace 
of mind, and damages are measured in terms of emotional distress.”); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 132, 
§§ 5:63–5:67.  But see Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834 (6th Cir. 1983) 
(conflating Prosser’s appropriation tort with publicity rights and requiring commercial harm for recov-
ery under appropriation). 
 239. See, e.g., Joe Dickerson & Assocs. v. Dittmar, 34 P.3d 995, 1002 (Colo. 2001) (“A plaintiff 
whose identity had no commercial value might still experience mental anguish based on an unautho-
rized use of her name and likeness.”).  But cf. Jackson v. Playboy Enter., Inc., 574 F. Supp. 10, 13 (S.D. 
Ohio 1983) (“[I]n order to state a cause of action for invasion of privacy by appropriation, the com-
plaint must allege that plaintiff’s name or likeness has some intrinsic value, which was taken by defen-
dant for its own benefit, commercial or otherwise.”). 
 240. Nimmer, supra note 138, at 203. 
 241. Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953). 
 242. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. d (1995) (“[T]he identity of 
even an unknown person may possess commercial value.”). 
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show that certain uses of their image caused emotional harm and thus 
win an appropriation-like claim.243  In principle, depending on the facts, 
social marketing might violate either branch of persona rights.  The ap-
propriation tort, with its orientation toward ordinary citizens, may be the 
more natural fit.  But in the highly interactive online environment of 
Web 2.0, there is at least some monetary value to trusted referrals.  Some 
social marketing cases might qualify for both claims simultaneously.244 
Another difference between the doctrines is the status of publicity 
rights as a form of property, which generally makes them transferable, 
alienable, devisable, and descendible.245  These features of publicity rights 
garner a great deal of scholarly attention.246  Here, too, however, the abil-
ity to convey publicity rights to others is secondary to the analysis of 
whether some form of persona rights might provide a good response to 
poorly designed social marketing. 
Finally, typical social marketing scenarios evade another thorny is-
sue over the boundary of “identity.”247  Courts have struggled to decide 
what features of a person must be appropriated for liability under the 
persona rights paradigm.  Results vary by state.  Under New York law, 
for example, only advertising uses of a “name, portrait, picture, or voice” 
are actionable.248  Other states are more lenient and have found liability 
for imitation of costumes, catchphrases, and poses.249  Social marketing, 
such as Facebook Ads, would satisfy a more stringent interpretation of 
identity like that of New York; social marketing goes beyond merely 
evoking a person’s identity250 and typically uses individuals’ names and 
often their photos. 
Having avoided all these difficulties, persona rights would appear 
quite promising as a basis for potential regulation of social marketing.  
Certainly, the facts at issue in cases of bad social marketing practices ap-
pear much closer to this type of claim than to theories under antidisclo-
 
 243. See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1103 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 
367 F. Supp. 876, 880–81 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)); see also Kwall, supra note 132, at 35–38 (discussing celebri-
ties’ emotional and dignitary interests in their public identities). 
 244. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 132, § 5:63. 
 245. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 132, §§ 9:17–9:40, 10:6–10:14 (collecting cases). 
 246. See, e.g., Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, Comment, The Descendibility of the Right of 
Publicity: Is There Commercial Life After Death?, 89 YALE L.J. 1125 (1980); Melissa B. Jacoby & Di-
ane Leenheer Zimmerman, Foreclosing on Fame: Exploring the Uncharted Boundaries of the Right of 
Publicity, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1322 (2002); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Is Independence Day Dawning for 
the Right of Publicity?, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 191, 207–28 (1983); David Westfall & David Landau, 
Publicity Rights as Property Rights, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 71 (2005). 
 247. See Sheldon W. Halpern, Essay, The Right of Publicity: Maturation of an Independent Right 
Protecting the Associative Value of Personality, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 853, 859–66 (1995). 
 248. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney Supp. 2009); see Burck v. Mars, Inc., 571 F. Supp. 2d 
446, 451–54 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (wrestling with the definition of identity under the New York statute). 
 249. See, e.g., Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997); White v. Samsung Elec. Am., 
Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992); Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th 
Cir. 1983). 
 250. Cf. Stacey L. Dogan, An Exclusive Right to Evoke, 44 B.C. L. REV. 291 (2003). 
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sure privacy law or trademark law.  Just as in the old Pavesich case,251 a 
marketer has used, for its own promotional purposes, a customer’s name 
and image.  Unlike the other paradigms, it would not matter whether the 
information in a social marketing message were especially personal, nor 
whether the message conveyed a misleading or false endorsement.  To be 
sure, sensitive private information or deceptive advertising would likely 
influence the outcome of a case by presenting more compelling facts.  
But a persona rights approach also covers cases that lack these features 
and nevertheless raise the concerns listed in Part II. 
In light of these observations, right after the introduction of Face-
book Ads, Professor Daniel Solove and I both suggested on our legal 
blogs that the program (as then structured) probably violated appropria-
tion torts and statutes.252  Yet no one sued on this basis.  The principal 
class action complaint over Facebook Ads omits any such theory from its 
eight varied counts.253  There are legitimate arguments that such a claim 
ultimately might not prevail, but the failure even to bring the claims (par-
ticularly in comparison to seemingly weaker bases for recovery that were 
plead, such as the ECPA254) suggests something more might be afoot. 
There are a few fairly technical reasons to omit such a claim.  One 
commentator notes that Facebook’s terms of service require application 
of Delaware law, which has minimal history with the persona rights pa-
radigm and no statutory protection (although some courts would refuse 
to enforce this choice of law provision).255  Variations within a social 
marketing program conceivably might prevent certification of a common 
question class action, although this too seems attenuated.256  Some part-
ner sites might implement the same social marketing program slightly 
differently, but serious factual distinctions among plaintiffs should be 
small in a suit against a single social marketing program.  Likewise, 
states’ divergent approaches to the persona rights paradigm might un-
dermine common questions of law, although plaintiffs would argue—and 
many courts would conclude—that the benefits of aggregation overcome 
 
 251. Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). 
 252. Posting of William McGeveran to Info/Law, Facebook Inserting Users into Ads, http://blogs. 
law.harvard.edu/infolaw/2007/11/08/facebook-social-ads/ (Nov. 8, 2007); Posting of Daniel J. Solove to 
Concurring Opinions, The New Facebook Ads—Starring You: Another Privacy Debacle?, http://www. 
concurringopinions.com/archives/2007/11/the_new_faceboo.html (Nov. 8, 2007, 11:27). 
 253. See Lane Complaint, supra note 7, at 40–57. 
 254. See supra notes 186–89 and accompanying text (critiquing the ECPA claim in the Lane com-
plaint). 
 255. Morganstern, supra note 4, at 192–95 (analyzing the impact of Facebook’s terms of service 
on potential privacy lawsuits and noting that, although the choice of forum clause favors California 
and the choice of law clause favors Delaware, it is not clear whether California precedents would dic-
tate enforcement of the choice of law clause); see Facebook, Terms of Use, Sept. 23, 2008, http://www. 
facebook.com/terms.php. 
 256. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2) (requiring common questions of law or fact for certification 
of class action); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (allowing class actions where such common questions predo-
minate over other issues and aggregation allows superior efficiency). 
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these typically minor legal differences.257  These technicalities of applica-
ble law and class certification could explain the omission of a persona 
rights claim from the Facebook class actions, but they do not themselves 
undermine the possible utility of the entire paradigm as a model for han-
dling social marketing.  Two other issues present broader problems. 
First, in most reported cases, there is no dispute over whether a 
plaintiff authorized the use of his or her persona.  Occasional cases in-
volve misunderstandings, such as a defendant obtaining a photograph, 
and mistakenly believing the plaintiff has consented to its commercial 
use;258 while this error might mitigate damages, it does not usually elimi-
nate liability.  Because the existence and nature of consent seldom arise 
in persona rights disputes, however, the case law has not developed clear 
standards to determine what qualifies as consent. 
Social networks cloud the issue of consent. Facebook’s chief privacy 
officer argued publicly that Facebook Ads did not violate persona rights 
because users had already agreed to the transmission of social marketing 
messages through their participation in the site.259  This cramped under-
standing of consent appears incorrect under current law.  Recall that the 
original structure of Beacon allowed web sites to initiate social marketing 
messages provided a customer did not affirmatively object.  When a cus-
tomer took an action at a Beacon partner site that would be the subject 
of a social marketing message, a pop-up window appeared briefly and in-
vited customers to decline to send such a message to their friends’ Face-
book News Feeds.  A lack of response meant the site could send the mes-
sage.  Apparently Facebook and its partners judged that the failure to 
opt out constituted the consent necessary to avoid liability for appropria-
tion.  Under at least some versions of the persona rights paradigm it 
would appear that such implied consent would be inadequate.  The New 
York statute, for example, demands prior written consent before using a 
“name, portrait, picture or voice . . . for advertising purposes or for the 
purposes of trade.”260  But the undeveloped law of consent in persona 
rights cases and the unclear nature of consent in social networks both 
complicate the analysis greatly. 
Second, proving damages presents difficulty, just as in other legal 
paradigms.261  Because persona rights are enforced entirely by private civ-
il actions, claims must result in damage awards measuring harm to indi-
 
 257. For discussion of this complex issue, see generally In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 
1293, 1300 (7th Cir. 1995); Allan Erbsen, From “Predominance” to “Resolvability”: A New Approach 
to Regulating Class Actions, 58 VAND. L. REV. 995, 1076–78 (2005); Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in 
Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 581–88 (1996). 
 258. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 132, §§ 3:34–3:35. 
 259. Posting by Saul Hansell to N.Y. Times Bits Blog, Are Facebook’s Social Ads Illegal?, 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/11/08/are-facebooks-social-ads-illegal/ (Nov. 8, 2007, 17:28) (report-
ing that Facebook Chief Privacy Officer Chris Kelly “said the advertisements are simply a ‘representa-
tion’ of the action users have taken: choosing to link themselves to a product”). 
 260. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS L. § 51 (McKinney Supp. 2009). 
 261. See supra notes 190–201, 220–22 and accompanying text. 
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viduals.  Celebrities usually can demonstrate the earning power of their 
personae and the reduction in value caused by unauthorized commercial 
use; damages awards in publicity rights cases can reach hundreds of thou-
sands of dollars.262  A few states that define persona rights by statute, in-
cluding California, also provide small minimum damages for violations.263  
For ordinary individuals whose identities are misused through bad social 
marketing practices, however, proof is difficult and legal standards are 
unpredictable.  As in any tort case assessing mental distress, courts are 
often hesitant to allow significant damages without evidence that severe 
consequences resulted such as physical problems or loss of employment.  
As to the standards, Professor McCarthy cites numerous cases attempt-
ing to assess the appropriate damages for indignity and mental distress 
and finds them “all over the map.”264 
Perhaps the difficulty in measuring or proving direct dignitary harm 
arises because these identity control damages are not very serious in 
most individual cases.  The injury is abstract.  An individual and isolated 
loss of identity control, in one social marketing message at a time, rarely 
hurts customers enough to justify a lawsuit.  Compounded through the 
entire society, however, a pervasive loss of identity control could be 
troubling.  In addition to these identity concerns, we have explored poss-
ible problems associated with unwarranted disclosure and misleading en-
dorsements.  These larger concerns cannot be addressed by enforcing 
persona rights in individual lawsuits based on the minimal harm to identi-
ty control caused in each instance. 
Overall, however, the persona rights rationale transcends the nar-
rower focus of other paradigms on protecting information privacy or 
preventing misleading advertising.  Privacy law demands consent only 
when information is sensitive, and trademark or unfair competition law 
require consent only if endorsements cause confusion.  Persona rights, by 
contrast, exist regardless of these circumstances.  Furthermore, they de-
rive their force from individual preferences rather than from overly gen-
eral legal characterizations about the nature of the information ex-
changed (sensitive or not; misleading or not). 
The exercise of persona rights would allow a customer to withhold 
permission from any or all social marketing, thereby preventing un-
wanted disclosures, ensuring the accuracy of implied endorsements, and 
controlling the quantity of messages to avoid spamification.  This out-
come is slightly odd, because persona rights are oriented toward the 
identity control concern, which I have argued is the least serious concern 
 
 262. See, e.g., Midler v. Young & Rubicam Inc., 22 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1478 (9th Cir. 1991) 
($400,000 for Bette Midler’s singing voice). 
 263. See CAL. CIV. CODE. § 3344(a) (West 1997) (providing minimum statutory damages of $750); 
IND. CODE. ANN. § 32-36-1-10(1)(A) (LexisNexis 2002) ($1000); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 597.810(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2004) ($750); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 26.013(a)(1) (Vernon 2000) 
($2,500).  In comparison, the VPPA’s statutory damages figure is $2500.  18 U.S.C. § 2710(c) (2006). 
 264. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 132, § 11:29. 
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at stake in social marketing.  Because they impose few conditions, how-
ever, appropriation and publicity rights actually offer the greatest scope 
for addressing all the possible concerns about social marketing, provided 
the problems of consent and proof of damages can be solved. 
D. Consumer Protection Law 
The final area of law is different from the others because it operates 
primarily through regulatory action rather than lawsuits.  Given the 
problems under all the other paradigms with the efficacy of private suits, 
this may be a significant advantage.  Admittedly, some would argue that 
federal agencies charged with enforcing HIPAA and financial privacy 
statutes have taken a lenient approach to violations thus far.265  A regula-
tory approach nevertheless may offer the best means to respond to con-
cerns about social marketing and also draw on the insights of the other 
paradigms. 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and state attorneys general 
sometimes intervene to protect information privacy as a form of consum-
er protection.  The FTC calls privacy “a central element of the FTC’s 
consumer protection mission.”266  A number of scholars have also ex-
amined the possibility of increased privacy regulation under the authority 
of consumer-based law such as the FTC Act or states’ comparable “little 
FTC Acts.”267 
In the past, the FTC’s focus in enforcing privacy has fallen rather far 
from social marketing.  For some years the agency has investigated com-
panies that violate their own self-declared privacy policies.  More recent-
ly, the Commission promulgated regulations concerning secure handling 
of especially sensitive personal financial information268 and brought en-
forcement actions for serious data security breaches.269  These problems, 
though potentially serious, are quite distinct from social marketing—and, 
in fact, would draw limited resources away from any action to regulate 
social marketing. 
Recently, the FTC has engaged in rulemaking that moves closer to 
the realm of social marketing.  In late 2008, the agency unveiled a pro-
 
 265. See Janger & Schwartz, supra note 168 (criticizing Gramm-Leach-Bliley enforcement); 
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NATIONWIDE REVIEW OF 
THE CENTER FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 1996 OVERSIGHT (October 2008), http://www.oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/ 
region4/40705064.pdf (criticizing HIPAA enforcement). 
 266. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Privacy Initiatives, http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/ (last visited May 26, 
2009). 
 267. See, e.g., Steven Hetcher, The FTC as Internet Privacy Norm Entrepreneur, 53 VAND. L. REV. 
2041 (2000); Reidenberg, supra note 84; Jeff Sovern, Protecting Privacy with Deceptive Trade Practices 
Legislation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1305 (2001). 
 268. See Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information, 16 C.F.R. § 314.1 (2008). 
 269. The FTC web site lists a number of data security cases the agency has pursued in recent 
years.  Fed. Trade Comm’n, Privacy Initiatives, Enforcement, http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/ 
privacyinitiatives/promises_enf.html (last visited May 26, 2009). 
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posed rule that would revise its guidelines concerning the use of en-
dorsements—including consumer testimonials—in advertising.270  Exer-
cising its authority to define terms under the CAN-SPAM Act, the FTC 
has also developed guidance about marketers’ use of e-mail, including 
“refer a friend” promotions.271  Finally, this year the agency issued a staff 
report proposing principles to guide industry self-regulation of behavior-
al targeting techniques.272  Using behavioral targeting methods, online 
advertisers mine the information they have gathered about individuals to 
build a profile of the customers and then target particularized advertise-
ments based upon that profile.273  The agency’s willingness to proceed in 
these more analogous areas might suggest openness to addressing con-
cerns that may arise from social marketing. 
Problems with social marketing go well beyond those presented by 
other endorsements or by behavioral targeting.  The proposed restric-
tions on consumer endorsements primarily would require that adver-
tisements featuring testimonials from customers whose results were un-
usual must include substantiated information about more typical 
results.274  This and other features of the rule aim to improve the informa-
tion quality of such advertisements, but they do not purport to reach so-
cial marketing. 
Companies engaged in behavioral targeting distribute personal in-
formation about their customers only to one another, whereas social 
marketing discloses similar information about an individual’s habits di-
rectly to his or her friends.  As I argued above, these disclosures within a 
social network actually represent greater harm.275  Furthermore, different 
parties benefit in the two structures.  Marketers accurately point out that 
behavioral targeting tailors the advertisements people receive based 
upon their own past preferences; this customization and convenience can 
benefit customers by informing them of products that might interest 
them and reducing irrelevant advertising messages.276  Social marketing, 
 
 270. See Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 72,374 ( Nov. 28, 2008) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 255). 
 271. See Federal Trade Commission, Definitions and Implementation Under the CAN-SPAM 
Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 29,654 (May 21, 2008) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 316). 
 272. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC STAFF REPORT: SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR 
ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING (Feb. 2009), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02/ 
P085400behavadreport.pdf. 
 273. See Stephanie Clifford, Many See Privacy on Web as Big Issue, Survey Says, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 16, 2009, at B5 (reporting survey that found only 28 percent of people were comfortable with 
behavioral targeting); IAB Behavioral Targeting: Secret Weapon in Display Ad’s Arsenal, http://www. 
iab.net/insights_research/iab_research/1675/368205 (July 2008) (projecting an increase in industry 
spending on behavioral advertising). 
 274. See Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising, 73 Fed. 
Reg. at 72,378–79; Association of National Advertisers, Press Release, FTC Announces Potential 
Changes to Endorsement & Testimonial Guidelines (Dec. 3, 2008), http://www.ana.net/advocacy/ 
content/1529. 
 275. See supra Part II.A. 
 276. Posting of Paul Barsch to Marketing Profs Daily Fix, Behavioral Targeting—Where’s the 
Fine Line?, http://www.mpdailyfix.com/2008/08/behavioral_targeting_wheres_th.html (Aug. 13, 2008); 
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however, helps the marketer sell products to the customer’s friends and 
perhaps helps those friends find products of interest.  It does not provide 
any comparable benefit to the customer whose personal information 
provides these advantages to others.  In fact, unless the endorsement is 
voluntary and the customer derives some satisfaction from advising 
friends about good products, it is difficult to perceive any gain for the 
customer at all. 
The substantive justification for regulatory action can be found in 
the authority of the FTC and state regulators to enjoin deceptive or un-
fair trade practices.277  Jeff Sovern has argued persuasively that this pow-
er could be used to stop intrusive data collection practices.278  Social mar-
keting presents an even clearer case, because the messages themselves 
may be misleading.  In addition, regulators could rely on the significant 
body of law discussed in this Article that could reach social marketing, if 
not for certain details that frustrate its effectiveness.  So, assume for ex-
ample that some social marketing techniques (such as the original Bea-
con) are unlawful under the appropriation tort or similar state statutes, 
but the mode of enforcement through private causes of action effectively 
insulates marketers from liability.  The FTC could draw on this underly-
ing law to justify and guide its regulation. 
Consumer protection regulators should also consider intervention 
because of structural factors that would make regulatory intervention su-
perior to case-by-case resolution in courts.  First, as we have seen repeat-
edly, problems of proof and damages would make individual suits over 
social marketing extremely difficult under any available law, whether 
privacy, trademark, or persona rights.  Harms would be distributed wide-
ly across many individual instances, each resulting in small damages, so 
injured individuals would have minimal incentive to sue.  A lawsuit ag-
gregating such claims would be unwieldy.  Second, judges lack the exper-
tise and fact-finding power that an agency can use to evaluate complex 
and quickly changing technology and associated business practices.279  Fi-
nally, a regulator such as the FTC can engage in a cooperative process 
with social networking providers, marketers, and privacy advocacy 
groups to develop an approach that accommodates competing interests 
to the degree possible.  The resulting standards would become a set of 
best practices, and regulators would serve as norm entrepreneurs to en-
courage businesses and users alike to internalize those best practices as 
expectations for all social marketing.280 
 
see also Posting of Andy Chen to ClickZ, The Three Dimensions of Behavioral Targeting,  http://www. 
clickz.com/showPage.html?page=3401511 (Sept. 1, 2004). 
 277. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006). 
 278. See Sovern, supra note 267, at 1326–39. 
 279. See, e.g., Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139–40 (1944). 
 280. See Hetcher, supra note 267, at 2046–52. 
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IV. CONSENT AND IMPLICATIONS 
This final Part of the Article draws on the analysis of existing legal 
paradigms and particularly their effectiveness at addressing potential 
concerns about social marketing.  Section A suggests a hybrid form of le-
gal intervention that ought to be considered as a response if lawmakers 
choose to regulate social marketing.  Section B considers possible objec-
tions to the proposal.  Taken together, these analyses also serve as an ex-
ample of an approach to regulating technology that maintains flexibility 
while addressing potential problems before they become entrenched. 
A. A Consent Paradigm? 
If the law responds to social marketing, then it should adapt the 
most promising elements of existing paradigms and address the full range 
of concerns discussed in Part II.  As Part III demonstrated, despite some 
overlap, inherent aspects of traditional U.S. data privacy and trademark 
law render them generally unsuitable for application to social marketing.  
A theory grounded in persona rights may offer the best substantive ra-
tionale for a legal response, whereas consumer protection law presents 
structural advantages over models that depend on private lawsuits for en-
forcement. 
Under the rationale of persona rights, commercial use of an indi-
vidual’s identity in social marketing would require that person’s affirma-
tive consent—as an opt-in, not an opt-out.  That general standard is a 
close cousin, or maybe sibling, of the appropriation tort and the right of 
publicity.  When marketers include a person’s photo in advertising or use 
celebrity endorsements, they must receive affirmative consent, not mere-
ly acquiescence.  But this consent-based standard echoes the other exist-
ing legal paradigms as well.  In privacy law, individuals waive some rights 
by consenting (explicitly or implicitly) to particular disclosures of their 
information.281  Similarly, licensing mechanisms allow trademark holders 
to authorize use of their brand identity by another party for its own 
commercial purposes.282  Both of these consent-based exceptions give the 
individual or company greater control over the presentation of identity 
to the outside world. 
Not only does a requirement of affirmative consent draw from all 
the paradigms, it also addresses all three types of concerns comprehen-
sively.  Genuine consent eliminates most of the problems with disclosure, 
because it ensures that an individual revealed personal information in-
tentionally.  Genuine consent would eliminate unfairness or deception 
 
 281. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b (1977) (“[T]here is no liability for 
giving further publicity to what the plaintiff himself leaves open to the public eye.”).  But cf. Nader v. 
Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E. 2d 765, 771 (N.Y. 1970) (distinguishing between casual observation and 
“overzealous” surveillance in applying this rule). 
 282. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 33 (1995). 
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that might run afoul of consumer protection law and would enhance ra-
ther than undermine information quality.  Instead of misleading reci-
pients, social marketing endorsements made with a customer’s full ap-
proval provide useful recommendations.  At the same time, the need to 
obtain consent would prevent social marketing messages based on cus-
tomers’ weak preferences, thus limiting their overall number and avoid-
ing spamification.  Voluntary messages even can provide useful feedback 
to marketers about their customers’ enthusiasm for various offerings.  
Finally, of course, to the extent that control over individual identity is a 
goal in itself, demanding genuine consent for commercial uses would 
achieve it. 
What qualifies as “genuine” consent?  Turning this broad standard 
into a workable rule may present some challenges, but they should not be 
insuperable.  Regulatory agencies like the FTC, viewing the entire in-
formation ecosystem and all the different forms of social marketing, are 
better equipped to navigate those obstacles than would be a court ex-
amining one fact-bound case.  The FTC (or a state regulator) could adopt 
a prophylactic rule presuming that social marketing messages without 
opt-in consent are deceptive or unfair marketing practices.  Perhaps the 
presumption would be rebuttable under certain facts.  Such a rule cer-
tainly would push social marketing to develop in accordance with these 
best practices.  Although this requirement can be justified solely on the 
basis of preventing misleading advertisement, the rule actually would en-
compass all three types of concerns: disclosure, endorsement, and identi-
ty. 
The two forms taken by Facebook Ads provide excellent examples 
of the principle in action.  Recall Figures 1 and 2 from the beginning of 
this Article.283 
 
 283. See supra Part I.C. 
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FIGURE 1 
SOCIAL MARKETING VIA SUGGESTION 
 
FIGURE 2 
AUTOMATED DIRECT SOCIAL MARKETING 
 
The social marketing structure depicted in Figure 2, in which the 
marketer sends a message unless the customer intervenes to object, 
would be unlawful.  This was the original set-up of Facebook’s Beacon 
program.  The revised form of Beacon sought individual permission for 
each social marketing message sent.  This structure, depicted in Figure 1, 
ensures that the customer furnishes affirmative consent for the disclo-
sures, the endorsements, and the reputational piggybacking on identity 
that result from a social marketing message.  Requiring action by the 
subject of a social marketing message recaptures the reality of word of 
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mouth before the internet.  Certainly, this type of social marketing would 
be legal. 
Of course, social marketing will develop new variations beyond the 
very simple distinction embodied in Figures 1 and 2.  For example, sup-
pose Blockbuster Video or Amazon.com created an application that al-
lowed users to share their video rental queues or book purchases with 
friends through a social networking site.  Users would sign up, and every 
time they chose a movie or book, a message would go to all their friends 
(or a subset of friends chosen by the user).  The message might insert a 
link allowing recipients to rent or buy the same item.  Many users already 
list favorite movies and books in their Facebook profiles.  Applications 
within Facebook such as Visual Bookshelf offer enhanced sharing of 
reading choices.284  Beyond platforms dedicated to social networking, 
Netflix allows users to share their rental queues with friends, complete 
with a special purple icon for movies a friend has seen and a percentage 
showing the similarity of a friend’s movie ratings to your own.285  These 
popular services exemplify the benefits of the socially connected Web 
2.0.  Friends use the technology to counsel each other in their consumer 
choices and propel more popular, and presumably better, offerings to 
success.  This structure affords the user more control than the opt-out of 
Figure 2, but might not ask permission for every individual social market-
ing message as does the traditional system in Figure 1. 
Early indications suggest that Facebook Connect may be just such a 
hybrid implementation.  Users initially choose to use their Facebook ac-
count as a log-in at another site.  As a result, that other site can offer “fe-
derated identity”—the ability to combine different online profiles to-
gether—and also gain access to that user’s social network.286  Presumably, 
this will become a vector for social marketing.  As of spring 2009, Face-
book was still reviewing its policies about the level of consent required 
before a partner site could transmit information to the Facebook News 
Feeds of a user’s friends.287  
 
 284. See Facebook, Visual Bookshelf, http://www.facebook.com/apps/application.php?id= 
2481647302 (last visited May 26, 2009). 
 285. See http://www.netflix.com/Community (log-in required) (last visited May 26, 2009). 
 286. SlideShare, Razorfish, Portable Social Graphs: Imagining Their Potential, http://www. 
slideshare.net/shivsingh/portable-social-graphs-imagining-their-potential-presentation (last visited 
May 26, 2009) (providing mock-ups of hypothetical implementations of Facebook Connect by Ama-
zon, iTunes, and iPhone games); see also Posting of Om Malik to GigaOm, supra note 43 (predicting 
Facebook Connect could emerge as “a highly effective advertising platform”); Rafe Needleman, Face-
book Connect: Scary but Good, CNET NEWS (Dec. 1, 2008), http://news.cnet.com/8301-17939_109-
10110382-2.html (describing benefits to sites implementing Facebook Connect). 
 287. See Facebook Developers, Facebook Connect Policies, http://wiki.developers.facebook.com/ 
index.php/Facebook_Connect_Policies#Feed (last visited May 26, 2009).  Somewhat confusingly, the 
policies require a “feed form” seeking consent, but contemplate an approval process—yet to be deter-
mined—that would allow developers to skip this step.  The policies also articulate “Best Practices” 
under which developers “should add a check box” to the feed form seeking consent, which could “be 
pre-checked by default.”  These policies are quite unclear and seem to send mixed messages about the 
level of genuine consent built in to Facebook Connect. 
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In response to these new variations on social marketing, a regulato-
ry approach again proves superior to case-based development of the law 
by courts.  A regulator can work with advocacy groups, social network 
providers, marketers, and other stakeholders to develop best practices.  
They might promulgate the resulting decision through formal rulemaking 
processes or more informal mechanisms such as advisory opinions or 
other agency guidance.  Regulators could mandate very granular permis-
sion and apply the opt-in model of Figure 1 to every individual message 
sent through a system like Facebook Connect.  Such intrusive and repeti-
tive opt-in requests might become a nuisance and inhibit social sharing, 
however.  A better rule probably would allow a user to grant global per-
mission, but could require a granular opt-out for particular messages and 
an easy means to cancel the authorization.  So, for example, a user might 
sign up one time for an application that allows Amazon to send social 
marketing messages about book purchases, but the user could click a 
prominent and clearly worded link before making a purchase saying, “Do 
not tell my friends about these purchases.”  The user also would be able 
to cancel the global authorization at any time.  These practices more 
closely approximate the robust requirements for genuine consent found 
in the persona rights model. 
A regulatory approach along these lines combines the flexibility and 
effective enforcement of consumer protection law, the scope of persona 
rights and their focus on individual preferences to trigger protection, and 
the consistent theme of individual consent found throughout the relevant 
law.  Creating that combination does not require dramatic new legal 
enactments or institutions.  Nor does it necessitate any wholesale expan-
sion of ownership rights.  Rather, regulators can combine the principles 
embodied by existing paradigms in a new way. 
Importantly, a consent-based regulatory requirement need not dis-
place other remedies.  In unusual situations where plaintiffs can success-
fully sue based on privacy torts, trademark claims, rights of publicity, or 
private claims under states’ “little FTC Acts,” they may proceed.  The 
analysis above, however, demonstrates that these ad hoc private legal ac-
tions will not respond effectively to most of the challenges of social mar-
keting. 
B. Potential Objections 
At least three objections might be made to such a consent-based 
model for regulating social marketing, concerning propertization of iden-
tity, free speech, and the need for legal intervention in fast-moving tech-
nological developments. 
To some extent the proposal above would expand persona rights 
and could be interpreted as creating additional intellectual property 
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rights.  Critics thus might view it as an unwise further “propertization” of 
identity.  Similar objections have been raised to the right of publicity.288  
At least in this setting, however, a focus on “property” would be an un-
helpful and largely semantic distinction.  It is a well-worn debate that 
arises when analyzing most privacy restrictions.289  Vesting an individual 
with any right can always be conceptualized as propertizing it.290  That is 
especially true if, as here, the individual can bargain the right away as 
part of an exchange (by, for example, consenting to social marketing 
messages in order to use a web site).  Moreover, regulatory best practices 
lack the most property-like elements of other persona rights regimes: 
alienability, descendibility, and private enforcement.  In any event, if this 
entitlement represents a form of property, then arguably it exists al-
ready—and it belongs to the marketer, who is free to piggyback on the 
customer’s reputation.  If so, then this proposal would merely shift the 
allocation of identity ownership from the marketer to the customer. 
A more substantial objection might arise on free speech grounds.  
As Eugene Volokh has argued, privacy-oriented regulations that qualify 
as a “right to stop people from speaking about you” can raise vexing First 
Amendment issues.291  The restrictions proposed here sidestep many of 
these issues because of the entirely commercial nature of social market-
ing.  These messages fall well within the boundaries of commercial 
speech as defined by the Supreme Court.292  The marketer, as the speaker 
of the message, has little purpose beyond “propos[ing] a commercial 
transaction.”293  As such, the Central Hudson test applies to any regula-
tion, and an opt-in requirement would likely pass muster.294  Indeed, 
some courts and commentators have gone further and concluded that 
sale or trading of customer information for commercial purposes enjoys 
little or no constitutional protection.295  Even skeptics like Volokh who 
 
 288. See, e.g., Post, supra note 127, at 667–70 (expressing concern that right of publicity commodi-
fies personality and detaches it from context of individual circumstances and social arrangements). 
 289. See Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1157–58 
(2000) (calling the debate a “quasi-religious war to resolve whether the nature of a person’s interest in 
her personal data is a fundamental civil liberty or [a] commodity interest”); Paul M. Schwartz, Internet 
Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 815–16 (2000) (criticizing “deeply flawed rhetoric” of 
market-state dichotomy). 
 290. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 957–58 
(1982); Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 739–46 (1964). 
 291. Volokh, supra note 150, at 1049–51; see also C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Informational 
Privacy or Gossip: The Central Meaning of the First Amendment, 21 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 215, 219–20 
(2004); Zimmerman, supra note 162, at 292–94. 
 292. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64–65 (1983); Va. State Bd. of Pharma-
cy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 759–65 (1976). 
 293. Va. State Bd., 425 U.S. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human 
Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)). 
 294. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564–66 (1980); see 
Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 245 F.3d 809, 818–19 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  But see U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 
F.3d 1224, 1237–38 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding regulators’ asserted state interest in privacy insufficient to 
sustain regulation under Central Hudson). 
 295. See Trans Union, 245 F.3d at 817–19; Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the 
First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1192 (2005). 
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question this result should be comfortable with regulation of social mar-
keting, however, because it is purely a form of advertising.296  Further-
more, the restrictions here aim not only to protect privacy but also to 
prevent misleading information in the marketplace, a long-respected jus-
tification for commercial speech regulation in areas ranging from trade-
mark law to securities regulation.  Indeed, courts have sustained the con-
stitutionality of the right of publicity in cases involving factual 
information about celebrities whose activities are certainly matters of 
public interest.297  Any First Amendment claim for protection of informa-
tion about ordinary customers’ shopping habits must be weaker.298 
Third, it is reasonable to question whether, in the end, the possible 
problems with social marketing justify even a lightweight “best practices” 
form of regulation.  Some of this hesitation may derive from an unjustifi-
ably extreme distrust of any government intervention in technology.  But 
some of it might reflect a more measured skepticism as to whether the 
problems discussed in Part II are serious enough to demand regulatory 
resources—particularly since, in the case of Facebook Ads, market forces 
reached a similar result without legal intervention.  As I have stated re-
peatedly in this Article, lawmakers may reach a sensible policy decision 
against regulation.  They could not reach this decision responsibly with-
out first considering the nature of the legal response, however.  Law can 
have a significant, and often neglected, role in shaping technological ar-
chitecture and ensuring the consistency of that architecture with impor-
tant social and legal values.299  In that way, the law can promote best 
practices through such modest measures as regulatory statements of opi-
nion, standard-setting, and norm entrepreneurship.300  This response na-
vigates between the two extremes in old debates about “cyberlaw excep-
tionalism.”301  I do not suggest, as some arguably did in the early days of 
the internet era, that the online environment is sui generis and should or 
could be regulated only by entirely novel legal models.302  The first step 
 
 296. See Volokh, supra note 150, at 1080–84.  More precisely, it is purely a form of advertising as 
to the marketer, whose speech interests would be at issue in an attack on social marketing.  Arguably, 
messages sent through social networking sites with consent also could implicate speech interests of the 
consenting customer.  In this scenario, however, my proposal would not impose any restrictions against 
the speaker. 
 297. See, e.g., Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 75 F.3d 1391, 1400–01 (9th Cir. 1996); 2 
MCCARTHY, supra note 132, § 7:3 (collecting cases). 
 298. Cf. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578–79 (1977) (upholding publicity 
rights against First Amendment challenge). 
 299. See Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Shaping Code, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 319, 321 (2005); 
Lawrence Lessig, Law Regulating Code Regulating Law, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 14 (2003); Joel R. Rei-
denberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. 
L. REV. 553, 570 (1998). 
 300. Hetcher, supra note 267, at 2052. 
 301. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 207; David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 
STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 
HARV. L. REV. 501 (1999). 
 302. See Johnson & Post, supra note 301, at 1367. 
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when facing a new online phenomenon that may require regulation 
ought to be an evaluation of existing legal paradigms that may suit the 
situation.303  Even when viewed in that more humble light, however, 
straightforward analogies of social marketing to existing legal paradigms 
fail to address all the concerns that might arise.  In that situation, creative 
adaptation is appropriate.  The potential problems arising from social 
marketing are not the most earth-shattering ever to threaten the internet.  
That is not, however, a reason to permit those problems to occur, merely 
because of a changed technological context. 
The proposal here does not require upheaval or tremendous re-
sources.  It merely articulates a consent standard that exists now, though 
sometimes obscured, in a variety of other legal settings, particularly the 
persona rights paradigm.  Individuals who object to the use of their iden-
tity in social marketing messages already have substantive law on their 
side through the appropriation tort, but procedural impediments prevent 
enforcement of that entitlement.  Put another way, the proposal here 
represents a small adjustment of existing legal principles to accommodate 
a new use of technology.  Social marketing falls between the cracks of ex-
isting legal regimes because of its novelty, but the principles underlying 
the nearest legal paradigms support a requirement of genuine consent. 
A final justification for legal intervention here is the danger that ir-
responsible social marketing practices by a few individual firms could 
damage the entire recommendation ecology.  While some individual 
marketers might see an advantage in transmitting nonconsensual mes-
sages, the resulting spamification and mistrust will harm more responsi-
ble businesses and the public interest in a robust Web 2.0.  Enforceable 
legal standards, in the form of best practices, could help prevent this out-
come. 
CONCLUSION 
Social marketing seems likely to grow and evolve in the future.  
Properly structured, it could offer great benefits to consumers and mar-
keters alike.  If poorly designed, however, it could cause a variety of 
problems: disclosure of private information, misleading endorsements, 
and appropriation of personal identity.  No existing legal paradigm in the 
United States addresses this full range of problems (including privacy, 
trademark and unfair competition, the appropriation tort and rights of 
publicity, and consumer protection law).  An approach based upon the 
common theme of genuine user consent and enforced through promulga-
tion of regulatory best practices offers a superior response.  Whatever 
the ultimate policy decision about appropriate legal intervention, the 
analysis in this Article demonstrates that the highly interactive communi-
 
 303. See Easterbrook, supra note 301, at 207–08. 
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cation technologies of Web 2.0 will disrupt settled legal categories and 
pose new challenges for lawmakers.  These effects have been felt already 
throughout the law of privacy, intellectual property, and free speech.  So-
cial marketing enables reputational piggybacking that was never possible 
before, and like many aspects of Web 2.0, it will force creative thinking 
about all the ways in which the law regulates disclosure, endorsement, 
and identity. 
 
